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The Two Rivers and the Lands Between: 
Mesopotamia and the International Law 
of Transboundary Waters 
Joseph W Dellapenna* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
All rivers and most aquifers of significance across the entire sweep 
of the Middle East, from Marrakech to Samarkand, are internationally 
shared water resources. The Middle East is the largest dry region (and 
the driest large region) on Earth; thus there is considerable (and growing) 
potential for conflict over these shared waters. I have already written 
extensively about various disputes relating to these more conflict-prone 
river basins of the region. 1 In this article, I will examine two such 
* Professor of Law, Villanova University; LL.M., Columbia University (1974) 
(Environmental Law); LL.M. in Public International and Comparative Law, George 
Washington University (1969); J.D., Detroit College of Law (1968); B.B.A. University of 
Michigan (1965). 
1. See WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CONFLICT OR COOPERATION? 157-80 (Thomas 
Naff & Ruth Matson eds. 1984) [hereinafter WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST); Joseph 
Dellapenna, Building International Water Management Institutions: The Role of Treaties and 
Other Arrangements, in WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: LEGAL, POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL 
IMPLICATIONS 55 (J.A. Allan & Chibli Mallat eds. 1995) [hereinafter LEGAL, POLITICAL AND 
COMMERCIAL IMPLICATIONS]; Joseph Dellapenna, Designing the Legal Structures of Water 
Management Needed to Accomplish the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles, 7 
PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 63 (1994); Joseph Dellapenna, Rivers as Legal Structures: The 
Examples of the Jordan and the Nile, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. _(forthcoming 1996); Joseph 
Dellapenna, The Waters of the Jordan Valley: The Potential and Limits of Law, 5 PALESTINE 
Y.B. INT'L L. 15 (1990); Joseph Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments for Managing Interna-
tionally-Shared Water Resources: Restricted Sovereignty vs. Community of Property, 26 CASE-
W. RES. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 27 (1994). See generally JOSEPH DELLAPENNA, MIDDLE EAST 
WATER: THE LIMITS AND POTENTIAL OF LAW (forthcoming 1996). 
For twelve years, I have consulted on the Middle East Water Project, under the Direction 
of Dr. Thomas Naff, first at the Middle East Research Institute of the University of 
Pennsylvania and later with the Associates for Middle East Research, Inc. The project has 
already produced a single volume study, WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra, and is now 
preparing a series of volumes on specific aspects of the water in the Middle East to be entitled 
WATER: THE MIDDLE EAST IMPERATIVE, publication having begun in 1990. My contribution 
to the series, MIDDLE EAST WATER: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF LAW, is completed and 
is to be published in 1996. I have also consulted with the Portuguese Directory-General of 
Natural Resources (Direc~Yao-Geral dos Recursos Naturais) as a Fulbright grantee in the 
summer of 1990. 
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conflict-prone river basins of the region-that of the Euphrates and the 
Tigris Rivers, the two rivers that together bound "Mesopotamia." 
Mesopotamia-the "land between the rivers" -rivals Egypt as the 
birthplace of hydrology. 2 Not so long ago-only some 12,000 years ago 
or so-the Middle East was not a dry region. During the Ice Ages, 
rainfall was plentiful and the Sahara and other deserts of the region were 
watered by now extinct rivers which fed broad grasslands with occasional 
small forests. After the glaciers retreated, the region rapidly dried out. 
This global climate change presented the relatively dense human 
population of hunters and gatherers with the prospect of imminent 
starvation, and presumably prompted most people in the region to 
migrate. 3 However, in the region near Mesopotamia, people found a 
way to adapt without migrating. Apparently, a few women (who were 
responsible for gathering, storing, and preparing seeds for eating) 
discovered that they could plant some of those seeds and thereby multiply 
the yield sufficiently to sustain their communities and even support an 
increase in population.4 This transition-the invention of agricul-
ture-occurred first in the hills stretching from what is now southeastern 
Turkey down through Syria and Lebanon to what is now Israel and 
Palestine. 
These early farmers did not know much about farming, and their 
practices caused heavy erosion of the hillsides where they planted. The 
soil washed down to fill the now dry valleys below, leaving behind 
The analysis and conclusions are my own, and do not necessarily represent the views of 
the American or Portuguese governments or of the Associates for Middle East Research, or of 
the Middle East Research Institute. 
2. See JACQETTA HAWKES & LEONARD WOOLEY, PREHISTORY AND THE BEGINNINGS 
OF CIVILIZATION 418-19 (1963); DANIEL HILLEL, RIVERS OF EDEN: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
WATER AND THE QUEST FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 97-98 (1994); NURIT KLIOT, 
WATER RESOURCES AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 116-17 (1994); LUDWIK TECLAFF, 
THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAW 15-25, 42-46 (1967); Yahia Bakour & John Kolars, 
The Arab Mashrek: Hydrologic History, Problems and Perspectives, in WATER IN THE ARAB 
WORLD: PERSPECTIVES AND PROGNOSES 121, 123-27 (Peter Rogers & Peter Lydon eds., 
1994); Mahmood Clor, A Land of Milk and Honey . .. and Salt, GEOGRAPHICAL MAG., Nov. 
1988, at 34; Robert Hager, Note, The Euphrates Basin: In Search of a Legal Regime, 3 
GEORGETOWN lNT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 207 (1990); Walid Saleh, Development Projects 
on the Euphrates, in ISRAEL AND ARAB WATER 69, 70-71 (Abdel Majid Farid & Hussein 
Sirriyeh eds. 1985). See generally ROBERT ADAMS, LAND BEHIND BAGHDAD: A HISTORY OF 
SETTLEMENT ON THE DIYALA PLAINS (1965); GEORGE CRESSEY, CROSSROADS (1960); 
WILLIAM WILCOCKS, THE IRRIGATION OF MESOPOTAMIA (2d ed. 1917); WILLIAM WILCOCKS, 
THE RESTORATION OF THE ANCIENT IRRIGATION WORKS ON THE TIGRIS (1903). On the early 
Egyptian experience with hydrology, see KARL BUTZER, EARLY HYDRAULIC CIVILIZATION IN 
EGYPT (1976). 
3. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 42-45. See also ARIES. ISSAR, WATER SHALL FLOW 
FROM THE ROCK: HYDROGEOLOGY AND CLIMATE IN THE LANDS OF THE BIBLE (1990). 
4. See generally JANE JACOBS, THE ECONOMY OF CITIES 18-48 (1969). 
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barren hillsides that are now characteristic of the region that gave birth 
to wheat-based agriculture. After a millennium or more, the farmers 
discovered that by digging ditches from the rivers out onto the remark-
ably flat plains of the land between the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers to 
bring water out to the now deep soils, they could bring the water to 
where the soil had already gone. 5 This transition introduced several 
major cultural changes that together we describe as the birth of civiliza-
tion. In particular, the ensuing increase in productivity enabled the 
creation of the first true cities in what anciently was called the "Fertile 
Crescent." 
Since the advent of agriculture, human life in the Middle East has 
always depended on successful management of the limited fresh water 
available in the region, especially once artificially irrigated agriculture 
was invented. 6 Irrigation requires the continuous application of more 
labor than the dry farming of the hills had required. Men as well as 
women now had to take part in agricultural work, especially irrigation, 
and this work had to be done in under strong, centralized leadership.7 
Yet siltation and salination from poor irrigation practices undermined the 
richness of the lands-the heart of the "Fertile Crescent" -a millennium 
ago, and the ravages of war completed the breakdown of the ancient 
irrigation systems by the middle of the thirteenth century.8 
5. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 51-54. 
6. See ISSAR, supra note 3; John Noble Wilford, Collapse of Earliest Known Empire 
[Akkad] Is Linked to Long, Harsh Drought, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1993, at Cl. The decline 
of cultures because of the failure to sustain elaborate hydraulic systems is not unique to the 
Middle East. See, e.g., FERENC GARAMI & ISTVAN KERTAI, WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE 
ANGKOR AREA (1993). 
7. See generally ADAMS, supra note 2; F.J. BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1-2 (R.K. Batstone trans. 1959); DANTE A. CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAW AND 
ADMINISTRATION 11-25 (1992); IRRIGATION-S IMPACT ON SOCIETY (Theodore E. Downing 
& McGuire Gibson eds. 1974); TECLAFF, supra note 2, at 15-25, 28-32, 42-47; KARL 
WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL POWER (1957); 
Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, at 121, 123-27; Lon Fuller, Irrigation and Tyranny, 17 STAN. 
L. REV. 1021 (1965); Vujica Yevjevich, Water and Civilization, 17 WATER INT'L 163 (1992). 
8. PETER BEAUMONT, GERALD BLAKE & J. MALCOLM WAGSTAFF, THE MIDDLE EAST: 
A GEOGRAPHICAL STUDY 362 (2d ed. 1988); H.E. DREGNE, DESERTIFICATION OF ARID LANDS 
11 (1983); HILLEL, supra note 2, at 51-58; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 117; LUDWIK TECLAFF, 
WATER IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (1985); Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, at 126; Clor, 
supra note 2, at 34; Robert Hager, Note, The Euphrates Basin: In Search of a Legal Regime, 
3 GEORGETOWN INIL ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 211-12 (1990); Terje Tvedt, The Struggle for 
Water in the Middle East, in SUSTAINABLE WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN ARID 
COUNTRIES: MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 13, 15, 18, 28 (Eric Schiller ed., 1992). 
On the problem of salinationofsoils generally, see F. GHASSEMI, A.J. JAKEMAN, & H.A. 
NIX, SALINISATION OF LAND AND WATER RESOURCES: HUMAN CAUSES, EXTENT, 
MANAGEMENT AND CASE STUDIES (1995); Mahmoud abu-Zeid, Water Resources Assessment 
for Egypt, in SUSTAINABLE WATER RESOURCES, supra at 173, 182-88; William Burns, The 
International Convention to Combat Desertification: Drawing a Line in the Sand?, 16 MICH. 
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Poor irrigation practices that cause soil salination and other 
environmental depredations have been a recurring problem since 
irrigation began in Mesopotamia, leading to the collapse of earlier 
civilizations, particularly in the lower reaches of the twin basins.9 
Traces of abandoned canals and tells (hills composed of rubble) of 
abandoned villages testify to the rise and decline of earlier communities, 
states, and empires. The region's dependence on the water of the the 
Euphrates and the Tigris continues to shape the political and economic 
life of the land between the two rivers, and provides a structure for the 
legal disputes over water in the Mesopotamia today. 
This article examines the modern law of the two rivers as found in 
treaties, less formal arrangements, and international legal custom. In part 
II, I describe the hydrologic setting for the modern law of the rivers. In 
part III, I discuss the economic and political context of that law. Finally, 
in part IV, I analyze the law itself. I conclude the paper with observa-
tions on how the yet unresolved legal problems of the two rivers might 
best be handled, and the prospects for such an outcome. 
II. THE HYDROLOGIC SETTING 
Although the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers are virtually separate, 
united only for the last 190 kilometers (118 miles) in the Shatt a!-' Arab 
(the "Shore of the Arabs"), 10 it is customary to treat them as a single 
socio-hydrologic unit because the two rivers in practice are shared by 
three states-Iraq, Syria, and Turkey-and those three states generally 
manage the three rivers in a coordinated fashion. Iran, which is a source 
of tributaries to the Tigris River, has not made any substantial use of 
those waters nor any claim to a share of the main stem of the Tigris. 11 
Of the two rivers that have shaped human life in the "Fertile 
Crescent," the Euphrates (Firat to the Turks, and Furat to the Arabs) is 
the longer and for much of its length the larger, and is more centrally 
located in the region. The Euphrates arises in the mountains of eastern 
Turkey, flows southwest for a time, and then turns southeast to flow 
J. INT-L L. 831, 843-44 (1995); Clor, supra note 2, at 34; Yahia Abdel Mageed, The Central 
Region: Problems and Perspectives, in WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: PERSPECTIVES AND 
PROGNOSES 101, 112-14 (Peter Rogers & Peter Lydon eds., 1994). 
9. Clor, supra note 2, at 34; George Cressey, The Shatt at-Arab Basin, 12 MIDDLE 
EAST J. 448, 448-49 (1958); Tvedt, supra note 8, at 18; Wilford, supra note 6. 
10. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 100, 111; Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, at 127. 
11. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 170; John Kolars, Water Resources in the Middle East, in 
SUSTAINABLE WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN ARID COUNTRIES: MIDDLE EAST AND 
NORTH AFRICA 103, 118 (Eric Schiller ed., 1992). 
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across the northwest of Syria and then down the length of Iraq. 12 At 
2,700 kilometers (1,675 miles), it is the longest river is southwestern 
Asia and the second longest in the vast region stretching from Morocco 
to Iran. 13 Despite its length, however, the Euphrates is a fairly small 
river. Its normal annual flow, as measured at Hit in Iraq, averages 
around 32 billion cubic meters ("BCM") annually, ranges between 10 
BCM and 40 BCM depending on variations in precipitation upstream. 14 
The average flow is a bit less than half of the current average flow of the 
Nile and less than one-third of the average flow of the Nile in former 
centuries. 15 The Euphrates averages only one-fourth the volume of the 
Rhine, a river that drains only a comparatively small region of humid 
western Europe. 16 
12. The geography of the Euphrates is described in brief but useful detail in Saleh, supra 
note 2, at 69-70. See also KLIOT, supra note 2, at 102. 
13. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 92; Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, at 137. Nurit Kliot 
gives the length of the Euphrates as 3,000 kilometers (1 ,865 miles). KLIOT, supra note 2, at 
100-01. Walid Saleh gives the length as 2,330 kilometers (1 ,450 miles). Saleh, supra note 
2, at 70. See also Hasam Chalabi & Tarek Majzoub, Turkey, the Waters of the Euphrates and 
Public International Law, in WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: LEGAL, POLITICAL AND COMMER-
CIAL IMPLICATIONS 189, 191 (J.A. Allan & Chibli Mallat eds. 1995); Jonathan Cohen, Note, 
International Law and the Water Politics of the Euphrates, 24 N.Y. U. !NIL L. & PoL. 502, 
507 (1991); Cressey, supra note 2, at 448. The discrepancies arise from differences of opinion 
regarding which of several streams is the furthest source stream of the Euphrates as opposed 
to a mere tributary. 
14. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 95, 102; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 108-09; JOHN KOLARS 
& WILLIAM MITCHELL, THE EUPHRATES RIVER AND THE SOUTHEAST ANATOLIA 284-85 
(1991); WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CONFLICT OR COOPERATION? 86 (Thomas Naff & Ruth 
Matson eds., 1984); M.M. Badry, et al., Water Resources in Iraq, in IRRIGATION AND 
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 315, 315 (S.S. Johl ed., 1980); Peter Beaumont, The Euphrates 
River-An International Problem of Water Resources Development, 5 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 
35, 36 (1978); Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, at 137; Ozden Bilen, Prospects for Technical 
Cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, in INTERNATIONAL WATERS OF THE MIDDLE EAST: 
FROM EUPHRATES-TIGRIS TO NILE 95, 96-103 (Asit Biswas ed., 1994); Tvedt, supra note 8, 
at 14; Boaz Wachtel, The Peace Canal Project: A Multiple Conflict Resolution Perspective for 
the Middle East, in WATER AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 363, 365 (Jad Isaac & Hillel 
Shu val eds., 1994) See generally Cressey, supra note 2, at 449-50, 458. 
15. The Nile currently averages between 70 BCM and 84 BCM per year, and several 
centuries ago average a little above 100 BCM per year. See HILLEL, supra note 2, at 119; 
KLIOT, supra note 2, at 22; JOHN WATERBURY, HYDROPOLITICS OF THE NILE VALLEY 13-14, 
20-22, 40 (1979); WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 128; Mesfin Adebe, The 
Nile-Source of Regional Cooperation or Conflict?, 20 WATER INT'L 32, 32 (1995); Peter 
Chesworth, The History of Water Use in Sudan and Egypt, in THE NILE: RESOURCE EVALUA-
TION, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, HYDROPOLITICS AND LEGAL ISSUES 41, 41 (P.P. Howell & 
J.A. Allan eds., 1990); Geoff Petts, Riches of the Nile, GEOGRAPHICAL MAG. Mar. 1988, at 
24, 26-27. 
16. Tvedt, supra note 8, at 14-15. 
218 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 10 
As with most rivers in the Middle East, the Euphrates is an "exotic" 
river that arises naturally in well-watered mountains and flows across an 
extensive dry area before reaching the sea. 17 While crossing the dry 
regions of northeastern Syria and the length of Iraq, it experiences large 
evapotranspiration and seepage (infiltration) losses, becoming smaller as 
it approaches the sea. The largest and last significant tributary of the 
Euphrates-the Khabur River-arises in southeastern Turkey and joins the 
Euphrates shortly after it enters Syria. The Khabur and other, smaller 
streams that also join the Euphrates in Syria add about 2 BCM to the 
flow, but these tributaries arise in Turkey and most of their flow as well 
represents precipitation over Turkey. 18 Virtually no water joins the 
river after crossing the Iraqi border, though evaporation rates reach as 
high as 70%. 19 Thus the Euphrates is largest well before it crosses the 
Iraqi-Syrian border. In all, about 98% of the water flowing in the 
Euphrates derives from Turkey, and about 2% from Syria.20 
The Tigris also arises in eastern Turkey (only 30 kilometers from 
one of the sources of the Euphrates) and flows south into Iraq. 21 The 
boundaries of Syria were drawn by the British and the French to enable 
the far northwest corner of Syria to barely reach to the upper Tigris. The 
Tigris forms part of the Syrian border with Turkey for 36 kilometers (22 
17. CHRISTIAAN GISCHLER, WATER RESOURCES IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST AND 
NORTH AFRICA 5 (1979); HILLEL, supra note 2, at 92; WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra 
note 1, at 85-86. For just how dry most of Iraq is, see KLIOT, supra note 2, at 105-08; Bakour 
& Kolars, supra note 2, at 131-32; Cressey, supra note 2, at 448, 450. 
18. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 95; WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 83; 
Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, at 128-30. 
19. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 95, 97; Bilen, supra note 14, at 108; Cressey, supra note 
2, at 455. See also EDWARD GOLDSMITH & NICHOLAS HILDYARD, THE SOCIAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF LARGE DAMS 140 (1984); Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, at 
128-29. 
20. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 112, 114-15; KOLARS & MITCHELL, supra note 14, at 3-5, 
191; WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 83-84; Beaumont, supra note 14, at 37; 
Cohen, supra note 13, at 507; George Gruen, Recent Negotiations over the Waters of the 
Euphrates and Tigris, in PROC. !NIL SYMPOSIUM ON WATER RESOURCES IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST: POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 100, 104 (Glenn Stout & Radwan AI-Weshah eds. 
1993; Hager, supra note 2, at 209, 219; George Joffe, The Issue of Water in the Middle East 
and North Africa, in RESOURCE POLITICS: FRESHWATER AND REGIONAL RELATIONS 65, 75 
(Caroline Thomas & Darryl Hewlitt eds. 1993); Tvedt, supra note 8, at 15. 
Two Turkish commentators have generously attributed 12% of the flow to Syria, 
apparently based on where the tributaries join the Euphrates, but without allowing for the fact 
that most of the water in those tributaries derives from precipitation in Turkey. Chalabi & 
Majzoub, supra note 13, at 191. 
21. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 96. For succinct but useful description of the geography 
of the Tigris, see M.G. !ONIDES, THE REGIME OF THE RIVERS EUPHRATES AND TIGRIS 115-18 
(1937); KLIOT, supra note 2, at 102-04. 
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miles) and with Iraq for a length of eight kilometers (5 miles). 22 It is 
one third-shorter than the Euphrates, measuring only about 1,840 
kilometers (1, 140 miles). 23 It also has a smaller flow until well into 
Iraq. The average flow of the Tigris as measured at Mosul in northern 
Iraq is 23 BCM. 24 
The Tigris, flowing further to the east and close to the mountains that 
mark the border between Iran and Iraq, exhibits some important features 
differentiating it from other rivers in the region. Most importantly, it 
receives major tributaries along its entire length, including several 
tributaries that arise in Iran, and many of which enter the main river in 
Iraq. One of those tributaries, the Greater Zab, contributes as much as 
13 BCM annually, and the tributaries reaching the Tigris in Iraq 
collectively contribute an average of around 30 BCM/year. 25 Thus, 
although the Tigris, like the Euphrates, experiences the major evapo-
transpiration and seepage losses characteristic of this dry, desert region, 
it is not an exotic river for it maintains and even enlarges its flow as it 
approaches the sea. In fact, the Tigris measures about 49 BCM per year 
at its terminus in the Shatt al-' Arab, although this flow varies consider-
ably from year to year. 26 As with the Euphrates, the major scene of 
historic use was in Iraq, but only a small amount of the water in the river 
was contributed by precipitation over Iraq. About 43% of the total flow 
derives from Turkey, with about 42% deriving from rainfall over 
mountains in eastern Iraq, and about 9% from Iran. 27 
Early in their history, the Euphrates and the Tigris each reached the 
Persian Gulf separately, but the growth of their deltas eventually led to 
their merger into the Shatt al-' Arab. Prior to 1974, the flow into the 
Shatt, really a vast swampland that is home to the "Marsh Arabs," 
measured about 66 BCM (a bit less than the average flow of the Nile). 
22. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 100. 
23. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 92; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 100-01; Bakour & Kolars, 
supra note 2, at 137; Cressey, supra note 9, at 448; Kolars, supra note 11, at 106. 
24. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 96; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 110; Bakour & Kolars, supra 
note 2, at 128; Bilen, supra note 14, at 96; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 15. Iraqi hydrologists have 
estimated the flow as 31.5 BCM. Badry, Mehdi, & Khawar, supra note 14, at 316. 
25. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 96; IONIDES, supra note 21, at 129; KLIOT, supra note 2, 
at 110; Badry, Mehdi, & Khawar, supra note 14, at 316; Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, at 
128; Kolars, supra note 11, at 108; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 15. 
26. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 96, 102; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 110; WATER IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 86-87; Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, at 128, 137; Kolars, 
supra note 11, at 106, 108. See generally Cressey, supra note 9, at 449-50. 
27. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 113-15; Beaumont, supra note 14, at 37; Gruen, supra note 
20, at 104; Kolars, supra note 11, at 108; Joffe, supra note 20, at 75. See also Bakour & 
Kolars, supra note 2, at 127-28; Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 191. 
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Most of the flow into the Shatt was lost through evaporation, and only a 
feeble 20 BCM were discharged annually into the Persian Gulf. 28 Of 
this combined flow, a bit more than 49 BCM (nearly 75%) were 
contributed by the Tigris, with the remainder coming from the Euphra-
tes. 29 
Today, the Shatt al-' Arab forms part of the border between Iran and 
Iraq, and has been the ostensible focus of the Middle East's longest and 
bloodiest war. 30 The disputes over the Shatt have been primarily over 
navigation and not over the consumptive uses that are the focus of this 
article. While forming the boundary between Iraq and Iran, the Shatt 
receives the overall system's last major tributary-the Kharun. At 830 
kilometers (515 miles), The Kharun is the longest river in Iran. But for 
the sharing of the Shatt with Iraq, the Kharun would be entirely within 
Iran. 31 
III. THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXTS 
The most notable economic and political feature of the two rivers is 
that Iraq, the major consumer of water from the rivers, contributes only 
small amounts of water to the flow of the Tigris and virtually none to the 
Euphrates. 32 Growing populations have placed immense pressure on 
28. Cressey, supra note 9, at 455. The figure for total flow comes from Kolars, supra 
note 11, at 106-08. Estimates for total flow range as high as 84 BCM/year-similar to 
estimates for the current annual average flow for the Nile. BEAUMONT, BLAKE, & WAGSTAFF, 
supra note 8, at 364; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 110; Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, at 127. 
The different estimates might simply reflect the high variability of the flow of the two rivers 
from year to year. BEAUMONT, BLAKE, & WAGSTAFF, supra, at 357. For the geography of 
the Shatt-al-Arab, see WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1. at 85; Cressey, supra note 
9, at 448-49, 452. 
29. One recent study gave a much higher estimate for the Euphrates' contribution to the 
Shatt-al-Arab, concluding that it accounted for about 58% of the combined flow in the Shatt. 
BEAUMONT, BLAKE, & WAGSTAFF, supra note 8, at 84. 
30. See generally SHAHRAM CHUBIN & CHARLES TRIPP, IRAN AND IRAQ AT WAR 
(1988); GULF SECURITY AND THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (Thomas Naff ed. 19!!5); THE GULF WAR 
OF 1980-1988: THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (lge Deekker 
& Harry Post eds. 1992); DILIP HIRO, THE LONGEST WAR: THE IRAN-IRAQ MILITARY 
CONFLICT (1991); THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR: ITS IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS (Efraim Karsh ed. 
1989); THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR: NEW WEAPONS, OLD CONFLICTS (S. Tahir-Kheli & S. Ayubi 
eds. 1983); TAREQ ISMAEL, IRAN AND IRAQ: ROOTS OF CONFLICT (1982); THE PERSIAN GULF 
WAR: LESSONS FOR STRATEGY, LAW AND DIPLOMACY (Christopher Joyner ed. 1990); 
SANDSTORMS: MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT AND AMERICA (Daniel Pipes ed. 1993). 
31. WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 85-87; Kolars, supra note 11, at 118. 
See also KLIOT, supra note 2, at 104, 111; Cressey, supra note 9, at 448. The Kharunjoins 
the Shatt-al-Arab 72 kilometers (45 miles) from the Gulf. Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, at 
127. 
32. Tvedt, supra note 8, at 15. 
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each of the three riparian states: The combined populations of Iraq, 
Syria, and Turkey have grown from about 39,000,000 in 1960 to around 
84,000,000 in 1990.33 Iran could add another 55,000,000 to the 
possible base of demand. 34 All four of these riparian states depend 
heavily on agriculture to employ their populations, and only Iraq and Iran 
have strong alternate resource bases in oil. 35 Each of the four countries 
must import substantial quantities of food to feed their growing popula-
tions, in quantities amounting to between 7% and 17% of their needs. 36 
Yet Iraq continues to employ 35% of its labor force in agriculture 
compared to only 3% in the oil industry. 37 The wars and revolutions 
of their recent history have left the Iraqi and Iranian economies largely 
in ruins despite all their oil, leaving them to fall back on agriculture 
nearly as much as Syria and Turkey have always depended on it. 38 
Iraq's dominance of the consumption of the Euphrates was nearly 
total until the 1960's, with little water being consumed at all in Syria or 
Turkey, 39 a pattern that can be traced back to the earliest antiquity. 
The three states have responded to the pressures of growing population 
by seeking agricultural self-sufficiency. To do this, they have sought to 
create adequate storage capacity within their own borders to satisfy their 
own plans without regard to the activities of the other riparian states.40 
All this storage considerably increases the evaporation losses from the 
33. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 153-54, 160; JOYCE STARR & DANIEL STOLL, U.S. FOREIGN 
POLICY ON WATER RESOURCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 12 (1987); Cohen, supra note 13, at 
516; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 17. 
34. KLIOT, supra note 2, at !53; J.A. Allan, Irrigated Agriculture in the Middle East: 
The Future, in AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 39, at 51. 
35. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 151-57. See generally Gunter Meyer, Economic 
Development in Syria since 1970, in POLITICS AND ECONOMY IN SYRIA 39 (J.A. Allan ed. 
1987). 
36. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 154. 
37. Cohen, supra note 13, at 511; Joyce Starr & Stephen Alley, Troubled Waters Ahead 
for Iraqi Irrigation, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1988, § 1, at 5. Greg Shapland gives the figure of 
20% as the employment level for agriculture. Greg Shapland, Policy Options for Downstream 
States in the Middle East, in WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 9, at 301, 316. In any 
event, Mahmood Clor has aptly caught the difference: "Oil, discovered in 1926, is the basis 
of Iraq's wealth but water from the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers is its sustenance." Clor, 
supra note 2, at 34. 
38. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 152-53, 170. 
39. Addeane Calleigh, Middle East Water: Vital Resource, Conflict and Cooperation, 
in A SHARED DESTINY 121, 124 (Joyce Starr & Addeane Calleigh eds. 1983); Cohen, supra 
note 13, at 511; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 15. At least some see the timing of the Syrian and 
Turkish development of the waters of the Euphrates came as a response to Egyptian propaganda 
depicting the High Dam at Aswan as the key to modernization and progress in the region, 
leading other governments to feel compelled to undertake similar projects. Chalabi & 
Majzoub, supra note 13, at 197-98. 
40. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 109; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 122-123, 160. 
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Euphrates system, especially in the hot dry plains of Iraq. 41 Such losses 
are particularly unfortunate as the three states together propose to store 
more than 200 BCM of Euphrates water-nearly three times the annual 
average flow of the two rivers combined (70-75 BCM).42 Not only can 
the Euphrates not sustain all this storage, but the storage projects also 
decreases the total water available to all by more than 10% due to loss 
by evaporation of about 8 BCM from the reservoirs. 43 
In this section, I shall examine in turn the Iraqi use of the Euphrates, 
the Syrian challenge to Iraqi dominance of the river, the Turkish 
challenge to the Iraqi and Syrian modus vivendi. I will then summarize 
the situation regarding the Tigris. Finally, I will examine the one 
proposal for joint activity on the rivers-the "Peace Pipeline." Not until 
the next section will I address the legal aspects of these experiences and 
proposals. 
A. Iraq and the Euphrates 
The two rivers have been depositing silt across their mouths for 
millennia, and today the greater part of Iraq is a nearly fiat plain 
composed of former delta lands aggregating more 100,000 square 
kilometers. 44 The still heavy silt loads of the two rivers gives rise to the 
two distinctive features of the Iraqi plain: It is extremely fertile if 
properly watered, and the rivers actually flow above the level of the 
plain. This latter feature arose because of the constant threat of flooding 
by the rivers. 45 The rivers have been contained by levees which cause 
significant amounts of silt to settle in the river bed, thereby raising the 
beds as well as the banks of the rivers above the level of the surrounding 
land. 46 
Irrigation began in what now is Iraq at least 6,000 years ago, but, as 
already noted, experienced periods of major decline due to the salination 
of the soil, and never recovered from the devastations of the Mongol 
41. IONIDES, supra note 21, at 111; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 122, 136; Beaumont, supra 
note 14, at 38-39. 
42. Iraq proposes to store 100 BCM, Syria 15 BCM, and Turkey 90 BCM. HILLEL, 
supra note 2, at 102-03. See also KLIOT, supra note 2, at 144-50, 167; WATER IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 93, 96-97; Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, at 137-40; Zohurul 
Bari, Syrian-Iraqi Dispute over the Euphrates Waters, 16 INT'L STUD. 227, 238 (1977); 
Beaumont, supra note 14, at 39; Kolars, supra note 11, at 108; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 16. 
43. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 103. A disproportionate share of this loss occurs in Iraq 
(5 + BCM) because of its extremely dry climate. 
44. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 93; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 102. 
45. See generally Cressey, supra note 9, at 449-55. 
46. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 54, 93-94, 96, 304-05 n.2; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 15. 
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invasion in 1258.47 Thereafter irrigation, while carried out on a small 
scale, largely languished until the early twentieth century. As elsewhere 
in the Middle East, British engineers began the development of modern 
irrigation on the Euphrates in the later years of the nineteenth century 
with the construction of the AI Hindiya Barrage in 1909, with other dams 
and canals following down to the present time.48 Dams and barrages on 
the Tigris followed in short order. By the 1970's, Iraq was consuming 
about 13 BCM from the Euphrates annually to irrigate about 1,550,000 
hectares, 49 and was consuming another 17 BCM from the Tigris River 
to irrigate another 1,200,000 hectares or so.50 Only about 25% of the 
agricultural lands in Iraq-in the hills near the Tigris River-rely on 
rainfall as opposed to irrigation. 51 About 42% of Iraq's total surface 
is irrigated. 52 
By 1970, Iraq's total water total consumption of 30 BCM/year (from 
the Euphrates, the Tigris, and other sources) arose from a base of supply 
generally ranging from 76 and 84 BCM/year, 98% of which was found 
in the Euphrates and Tigris system. 53 In contrast, Syria was then 
consuming about 2 BCM/year from the two rivers, mainly from the 
Euphrates, and Turkey about 820 MCM/year from the two rivers, also 
47. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 15-16,44-45,51-58,72-73, 98-99; TECLAFF, supra note 
8, at 1; Clor, supra note 2; Marc Ross, Comment, Environmental Warfare and the Persian 
Gulf War: Possible Remedies to Combat Destruction of the Environment, 10 DICKINSON J. 
INT'L L. 515, 517 (1992); Tvedt, supra note 8, at 15, 18. 
48. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 99; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 117-20; WATER IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 89-90, 92-93; Badry, Mehdi, & Khawar, supra note 14, at 
318; Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 198; Clor, supra note 2, at 34-35; Hager, supra 
note 2, at 211; John Kolars, Problems of International River Management: The Case of the 
Euphrates, in INTERNATIONAL WATERS OF THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 14, at 44, 82-83; 
Saleh, supra note 2, at 72-73; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 15. 
49. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 144; Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, at 135; Kolars, supra 
note 11, at 107. Estimates as to the amount of water consumed from the Euphrates and as to 
the amount of land irrigated actually vary considerably. See Martin Adams & James Holt, The 
Use of Land and Water in Modern Agriculture-An Assessment, in AGRICULTURAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 63, 64 (Peter Beaumont & Keith McLachlan eds. 1985); 
Herbert Ockerman & Shimon Samano, The Agricultural Development of Iraq, in AGRICUL-
TURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra, at 189, 192; K. Ubell, Iraq's Water 
Resources, in 7 NATURE & RESOURCES, No. 2, at 3, 4 (1971); John Waterbury, Trans-
boundary Water and the Challenge of International Cooperation in the Middle East, in WATER 
IN THE ARAB WORLD, supra note 2, at 39, 63 n.lO. 
50. Kolars, supra note 11, at 108; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 15. These figures are also 
highly variable. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 146; Ubell, supra note 49, at 4. 
51. GISCHLER, supra note 17, at 99; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 143. 
52. Abdul-Karim Sadik & Shawki Barghouti, The Water Problems of the Arah World: 
Management of Scarce Resources, in WATER IN THE ARAB WoRLD, supra note 2, at 1, 8. 
53. BEAUMONT, BLAKE, & WAGSTAFF, supra note 3, at 84; GISCHLER, supra note 17, 
at 100; W.B. FISHER, THE MIDDLE EAST 388 (1978); KLIOT, supra note 2, at 143. 
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mainly from the Euphrates.54 A decade later the Syrian and Turkish 
figures were more than doubled. 55 The pressures on the Euphrates 
would continue to rise throughout the remaining two decades of the 
twentieth century, placing Iraq in an extremely vulnerable position even 
before the war with Iran and the Gulf War. 
Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, responded to the threat by doubling its 
financial commitment to water facilities and bringing several new dams 
on line in the later 1980s.56 These efforts increased Iraq's current total 
storage capacity to around 100 BCM.57 Before the Gulf War, Iraq was 
planning to irrigate an additional 1,830,000 hectares, mostly between Hit 
and Hindiya, to improve drainage of the irrigated lands in lower Iraq, to 
divert water from the Tigris to the Euphrates, and to increase its 
hydroelectric generation.58 Improved drainage is particularly important 
to Iraq as the only effective means of dealing with the continuing problem 
of soil salination, 59 although the drainage projects have been criticized 
as an "environmental crime" and as attempted genocide against the Marsh 
Arabs. 60 In all, the Iraqi designs will require diversions from the 
Euphrates aggregating in the neighborhood of 25 BCM annually-nearly 
double the diversions from that river in 1970.61 Unfortunately, Turkish 
releases from the Atatiirk Dam will only be about 15 BCM or less 
annually, 62 and Syrian usage will consume the bulk of this flow. 63 
Since 1980, Iraq has been continuously at war with Iran, or over 
Kuwait, or with portions of its own population. Iraq faced a threatening 
situation regarding water before it embarked on its wars with its 
neighbors. Before the Gulf War, Iraq employed only about 12% of its 
labor force in agriculture to generate about 7% of its Gross Domestic 
54. Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, at 128; Kolars, supra note 11, at 107. 
55. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 143. 
56. Badry, Mehdi, & Khawar, supra note 14, at 318; Cohen, supra note 13, at 510-11; 
Hager, supra note 2, at 212; Starr & Alley, supra note 37; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 15. 
57. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 122; Badry, Mehdi, & Khawar, supra note 14, at 316. 
58. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 100-02; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 145, 147; WATER IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 92, 98; Badry, Mehdi, & Khawar, supra note 14, at 325-26; 
Bilen, supra note 14, at 103-07; Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 206 n.48; Kolars, supra 
note 11, at 117; Kolars, supra note 48, at 83-87; Saleh, supra note 2, at 73-74; Tvedt, supra 
note 8, at 16. 
59. CRESSEY, supra note 2, at 390; FISHER, supra note 53, at 387; HILLEL, supra note 
2, at 99; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 158-59; Cressey, supra note 9, at 452; Ubell, supra note 49, 
at 9. 
60. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 102. 
61. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 145; Kolars, supra note 48, at 84. For the 1970 figures, 
see the text supra at notes 49-53. 
62. Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 204. See also the text infra at notes 214-15. 
63. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 146; Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 204. 
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Product. 64 This effort, however, consumed 92% of its water usage. 65 
We have no reliable figures regarding the use of water in Iraq today, 
although the continuing international boycott of Iraqi oil and other 
products suggests that agriculture plays an even greater role in the 
economy today than before the war. After two disastrous wars and with 
heavy pre-war debts to service, it is doubtful that Iraq will be able to pay 
for its food imports even if the restrictions on its sale of oil were to be 
lifted. 66 
As the most downstream state sharing the twin basins, Iraq is in a 
particularly exposed situation. In a strong sense, Iraq epitomizes the 
comment of Samuel Baker, a British explorer of the late nineteenth 
century: "No water, no Arabs. "67 The Iraqis were already experienc-
ing water shortages during the summer months before Syrian and Turkish 
development, for these hot dry months produce an average flow of half 
or less of the winter peaks, yet these are precisely the months in which 
the growing crops most need water. 68 Impending development in the 
upstream states portends possible disaster for Iraq, with Iraq losing 
perhaps as much as 90% of the Euphrates waters on which it has 
depended for millennia. 69 It goes too far, however, to suggest as 
historian Terje Tvedt that Iraq could be devastated to a similar extent as 
it was during the invasions led by Hulagu Khan in 1258.70 Much of this 
shortfall could be made up by compensatory diversions from the Tigris 
over to the Euphrates farms. 7I Iraqi agricultural practices are also 
inefficient, leaving considerable room to forestall some losses by 
improved methods of irrigation and drainage. 72 Still, diversions from 
the Tigris and improved efficiency leaves no room for increasing the 
agricultural lands and probably will result in some net losses in the face 
of a steadily increasing population. The Iraqis then have a sound basis 
64. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 158. 
65. Sadik & Barghouti, supra note 52, at 3. 
66. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 159. 
67. As quoted in Tvedt, supra note 8, at 29. 
68. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 109. 
69. !d .. at 146. 
70. Tvedt, supra note 8, at 18. 
71. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 146; Kolars, supra note 11, at 117; Saleh, supra note 2, at 
73-74; Shahim Tekeli, Turkey Seeks Reconciliation for the Water Issue Induced by the 
Southeastern Anatolian Project (GAP), 15 WATER INT'L 206, 215 (1990); Tvedt, supra note 
8. 
72. BEAUMONT, BLAKE, & WAGSTAFF, supra note 3, at 352, 364; FISHER, supra note 
42, at 378; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 146, 150, 158, 163-64, 170; WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 
supra note 1, at 98; Cressey, supra note 9, at 458; Ockerman & Samano, supra note 39, at 
194; Saleh, supra note 2, at 73-74; Ubell, supra note 39, at 3. Syria also has considerable 
inefficiencies. WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra, at 97-98. 
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in experience to fear significant diminution in the quantity, quality, or 
rate of flow of the water flowing down to them. 73 
B. The Syrian Challenge to Iraq 
The practice of leaving Iraq near exclusive use of the waters of the 
Euphrates and the Tigris began to change in the 1960's when Syria 
announced plans to construct the Tabqa Dam designed to store about 12 
BCM the Euphrates River in a reservoir named Lake Assad. 74 Syria is 
a generally dry state that has little water available from catchment areas 
within its territory. Syria depends primarily on water flowing in the 
Euphrates and the Orontes Rivers, both rivers that originate in mountains 
outside Syria. 75 Even the Yarmuk River, the catchment are of which is 
largely in Syria, is an international stream shared with the Israelis and the 
Jordanians. 76 Though more than 85% of Syria's agriculture is rain-
fed, 77 rainfed agriculture generally is less productive than irrigated 
agriculture, even in humid regions. 78 Yet for Syria to undertake to 
develop its water resources, a necessary precondition to increasing its 
agricultural output, the development will nearly always implicate 
international concerns. This is particularly true regarding the Euphrates, 
easily Syria's largest river and most important water resource: The 30 
BCM it brings into Syria is about 10 times the total of all other surface 
sources in Syria combined, and six times as much as all other water 
sources combined. 79 
The international dimensions of water use in Syria were most clearly 
visible in the dispute over the Tabqa Dam. Under prodding from 
Western agencies, Iraq and Syria had been engaged in serious negotia-
tions over the undertaking of a joint project on the Euphrates; these 
negotiations broke down when Soviet funding became available. 80 The 
Tabqa Dam was then constructed with Soviet Aid after the World Bank 
73. TECLAFF, supra note 8, at 1; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 18-19; Wilford, supra note 6. 
74. Badry, Mehdi, & Khawar, supra note 14, at317; Bari, supranote42; Kolars,supra 
note 48, at 44, 80-82; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 15-16, 28. See also KLIOT, supra note 2, at 
120-22, 161-62; Saleh, supra note 2, at 74. 
75. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 137-38. 
76. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 169, 310 n.18; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 209-12, 222-24; 
Dellapenna, Jordan Valley, supra note 1, at 20, 26-27; Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, at 133-
34; Aaron Wolf, A Hydropolitical History of the Nile, Jordan and Euphrates River Basins, in 
INTERNATIONAL WATERS OF THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 14, at 5, 34. 
77. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 139; Sadik & Barghouti, supra note 52, at 8. 
78. See Sadik & Barghouti, supra note 52, at 7. 
79. GISCHLER, supra note 17, at 114; HILLEL, supra note 2, at 107; KLIOT, supra note 
2, at 138. 
80. Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 198-201. 
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and western institutions declined to finance it,81 and introduced a period 
of intense dispute between the states riparian to Euphrates. By 1975, 
with the flow of water in the Euphrates reduced from an expected 920 
cubic meters per second (m3/sec.) to only 197 m3/sec., Iraq and Syria 
seemed on the verge of war over the waters of the Euphrates. 82 Iraq 
apparently failed to understand that Syria's actions were not the only 
cause of Iraq's water shortage; 1974 was an exceptionally dry year, and 
Turkey also begun filling the reservoir behind its Keban Dam in 1974.83 
The dispute over the Tabqa Dam, between two left-leaning Arab 
states both ruled by factions of the Ba'ath Party, was largely ignored in 
the West where it did not fit either the paradigm of Cold War conflict or 
the paradigm of Arab-Israeli conflict. 84 After mediation by Saudi 
Arabia and the Soviet Union, Syria agreed to slow the filling of its 
reservoir and to assure that 40% of the flow of the river came down to 
Iraq, ostensibly as an act of "goodwill" rather than because it accepted 
any Iraqi legal claim to receive the water. 85 While controversy dimin-
ished under this arrangement, Iraqi diplomatic protests recurred from 
time to time. Syria in turn supported Iran in its war with Iraq without 
becoming directly involved in any fighting and took an active part in 
supporting the Allied Coalition during the Gulf War. 86 Water concerns 
were certainly not the only reasons for Syria's posture on these matters, 
and probably not even primary reasons, but concerns over water probably 
played a role at least in reinforcing Syrian policies decided on other 
grounds. 
81. WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 97; Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 
13, at 197-200; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 16. 
82. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 108-09; WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 90, 
93-94; Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 196; Cohen, supra note 13, at 511-12; Gruen, 
supra note 20, at 100; Hager, supra note 2, at 212; Joffe, supra note 20, at 75; Kolars, supra 
note 48, at 65; Shapland, supra note 37, at 313; Joyce Starr, Water Wars, 82 FOREIGN PoL'Y 
17, 31 (1991); Tvedt, supra note 8, at 16; Wolf, supra note 76, at 5, 29. 
83. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 111, 136, 161-62; WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 
1, at 91; Beaumont, supra note 14, at 41; Mahmood Clor, A River of Contention, GEOGRAPH-
ICAL MAG., Nov. 1988, at 36; Cohen, supra note 13, at 511; Hager, supra note 2, at 212; 
Waterbury, supra note 49, at 57. The filling of the Tabqa Dam was delayed by the porous 
nature of the limestone underlying the reservoir; this was solved by injecting cement into the 
limestone and covering the whole with clay. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 105. 
84. Tvedt, supra note 8, at 16. See also KLIOT, supra note 2, at 166; WATER IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 95. 
85. EBERHARD KIENLE, BA'ATH VERSUS BA'ATH: SYRIAN RELATIONS WITH IRAQ 
SINCE 1968, at 96-100 (1990). See also HILLEL, supra note 2, at 109; KLIOT, supra note 2, 
at 161-62; WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 93-96; Cohen, supra note 13, at 
512; Gruen, supra note 20, at 100; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 16; Waterbury, supra note 49, at 
57; Wolf, supra note 76, at 29. 
86. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 166; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 16. 
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The Syrians intended to use the Tabqa Dam to irrigate approximately 
640,000 hectares. 87 In fact water was applied to land more slowly than 
planned, largely because of poor soils in the reclamation area, so that 
even today somewhat less than 400,000 hectares are actually irrigated.88 
The dam also fell far short of its projected electricity production.89 
Syria's storage on the Euphrates is now about 12 BCM90 and proposes 
to increase this to 15 BCM. 91 This storage, if unhindered by the 
activities or needs of other riparian states, is adequate to accomplish the 
proposed irrigation and to provide water for hydroelectric generation and 
for export to the urban centers in western Syria.92 
Despite the effort that has gone into the Tabqa Dam, the amount of 
land actually irrigated in Syria has fallen by perhaps as much as 20% 
since 1960, with only about 24% of Syrian labor continuing to be 
employed in agriculture. 93 Syrian agriculture today produces about 28% 
of the Gross Domestic Product, 94 yet still consumes 83% of Syria's 
water usage. 95 The loss of irrigated land in Syria has been variously 
attributed to the inundation of good land behind the Tabqa and other 
dams, waterlogging and salination of soils, and even the impact of land 
reforms. 96 In an effort to increase the amount of irrigated lands, Syria 
was committing as much as 40% of its national budget to irrigation and 
hydroelectric facilities by 1988.97 This heavy investment is directed at 
doubling or tripling withdrawals from the Euphrates to a level approach-
87. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 109; WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 91; 
Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, at 134; Kolars, supra note 48, at 81-82; Tvedt, supra note 8, 
at 16. 
88. BEAUMONT, BLAKE, & WAGSTAFF, supra note 3, at 383; HILLEL, supra note 2, at 
107-08; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 139; KOLARS & MITCHELL, supra note 14, at 260; WATER 
IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 90-91, 97; Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 205, 
213; Cohen, supra note 13, at 511; Kolars, supra note 11, at 106; Kolars, supra note 48, at 
81-82; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 16. 
89. Cohen, supra note 13, at 509-10; David Ottaway, Turkey Vies with Syria for Water, 
WASH. POST, May 19, 1984, at A19, A22. 
90. GISCHLER, supra note 17, at 114; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 122, 138. 
91. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 109. 
92. GISCHLER, supra note 17, at 114; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 142-43. 
93. BEAUMONT, BLAKE, & WAGSTAFF, supra note 3, at 383; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 
139; Shapland, supra note 37, at 316. 
94. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 157; Ian Manners & Tagi Sagafi-Nejad, Agricultural 
Development in Syria, in AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 39, 
at 255, 257; Sadik & Barghouti, supra note 52, at 1, 10. 
95. Sadik & Barghouti, supra note 52, at 3. 
96. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 139, 157; Bilen, supra note 14, at 108-09; Manners & 
Sagafi-Nejad, supra note 94, at 263. See generally GOLDSMITH & HILDYARD, supra note 19, 
at 140-47. 
97. Tvedt, supra note 8, at 16. See also HILLEL, supra note 2, at 109. 
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ing 10 BCM annually. 98 Work that has also begun on a project to pump 
water up from the Tigris gorge to irrigate 150,000 hectares will no doubt 
generate yet further international disputes. 99 Notwithstanding all of this 
effort, however, Syria may face a serious water deficit by the year 2000 
thanks to largely to the GAP project in Turkey. 100 
C. Turkey Enters the Game 
Turkey is one of the few states in the entire Middle East that can 
fairly be described as having a water surplus, 101 primarily because, until 
recently, it had not invested heavily in developing its waters. Even 
before major investment in water projects began, employment in Turkish 
agriculture had declined to 40% of the Turkish labor force, and their 
contribution to Turkey's Gross National Product had declined to only 
17%. 102 This decline is likely due to the fact that, while per capita 
income in Turkey is a relatively prosperous (by Middle Eastern 
standards) US$ 1,630 annually, farmers on average earn only about 40% 
of this figure. 103 Yet Turkey, alone of the states sharing the Mesopota-
mian basin, has the prospect of becoming wholly self-sufficient in 
agricultural production. 104 The highly mountainous east of Turkey was 
ideal for hydroelectric generation, while there were extensive areas in the 
Turkish portion of historic Mesopotamia that would lend themselves to 
irrigation. With this context in mind, it should not have surprised anyone 
when Turkey began to make major investments in dams and other water 
use facilities. 
Turkey quietly completed its first large dam on the Euphrates at 
Keban in 1974. 105 Nine years later, in 1983, Turkey followed the 
filling of the Keban Dam by beginning work on its Southeast Anatolia 
98. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 139-42; Beaumont, supra note 14, at 40. 
99. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 138; Waterbury, supra note 49, at 63-64 n.12. 
100. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 143; Godfrey Jansen, Tussle over the Euphrates, MIDDLE 
EAST INT"L, Feb. 16, 1990, at 12; Mikhail Wakil, Analysis of Future Water Needs for 
Different Sectors in Syria, 18 WATER INT"L 19 (1993). 
101. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 104-08, 133-34, 137, 150; Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, 
at 121-23, 139; Joffe, supra note 20, at 73; Kolars, supra note 11, at 117; Waterbury, supra 
note 49, at 39. 
102. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 155-56; Keith McLachlan, The Agricultural Development of 
the Middle East: An Overview, in AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra 
note 49, at 27, 34. 
103. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 156; John Dewdney, Agricultural Development in Turkey, 
in CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 213, 214 (John Clark & Howard Bowen 
Jones eds. 1981). 
104. Cohen, supra note 13, at 508. 
105. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 126, 161; Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 199-200, 
202; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 16. 
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Project (known by its Turkish acronym GAP-Guneydogu Anadolu 
Projesi). 106 The GAP will eventually include 15 dams, 14 hydroelectric 
facilities, and the irrigation of 700,000 hectares, a feat that will consume 
about 40% of the normal annual flow of the Euphrates as measured at the 
Keban Dam in eastern Turkey. 107 The center-piece of Turkey's GAP 
project is the massive Atati.irk Dam, designed to store, by itself, the 
equivalent of about one-and-a-half years flow of the Euphrates River, in 
all about 49 BCM. 108 That storage, when combined with other planned 
or existing Turkish dams on the Euphrates, will aggregate over 100 
BCM. 109 Turkey's storage is now sufficient to enable Turkey to 
consume about 21 BCM/year, and estimates for its eventual irrigation in 
the GAP range as high as 2,000,000 hectares. 110 
Turkey has experienced serious difficulties in accomplishing its grand 
plans for the Euphrates. International financing was denied because of 
the lack of agreement among the riparian states on how to share the 
waters of the Euphrates, leaving Turkey to generate the US$ 21,000,-
106. See generally HILLEL, supra note 2, at 104-06; KuoT, supra note 2, at 124-31; 
Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 201-06. 
107. NATASHA BESCHORNER, WATER AND INSTABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 31 (Adelphi 
Paper No. 273, Institute for Strategic Studies 1992); HILLEL, supra note 2, at 37, 104-06; 
KoLARS & MITCHELL, supra note 14, at 260; Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, at 137; Chalabi 
& Majzoub, supra note 13, at 189, 201-04, 214-15; Clor, supra note 83, at 36; Gruen, supra 
note 20, at 101-03; Kolars, supra note 11, at 106; Kolars, supra note 44, at 48-50, 54-63, 66-
77; Tekeli, supra note 71, at 207; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 16; Okay Onver & Bruno Voron, 
Improvement of Canal Regulation Techniques: The Southeastern Anatolia Project-GAP, 18 
WATER INT'L 157 (1993); Waterbury, supra note 49, at 54. On the importance of 
hydropower to Turkey, see KLIOT, supra note 2, at 134-36. The precise number of dams, 
hydroelectric facilities, and irrigated hectares reported to the project vary considerably in 
different studies because the Turks themselves have frequently revised their plans; the figures 
in the text are less than half of those originally proposed. See HILLEL, supra note 2, at 105; 
KLIOT, supra, at 125; Beaumont, supra note 14, at 38; Cohen, supra note 13, at 508, 511; 
Clyde Haberman, Sanliurfa Journal: Dam Is Watering Hope for a New Fertile Crescent, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1990, at A4; John Kolars, The Hydro-Imperative of Turkish Search for 
Energy, 40 MIDDLE EAST J. 53 (1986); Okay Onver, Bruno Voron, & Turhan Akiiziim, 
Improvement of Field Water Distribution and Irrigation Techniques: The SoutheasternAnatolia 
Project-GAP, 18 WATER INT'L 166, 167 (1993); Tvedt, supra, at 16. See generally U. (:'lzis, 
The South-East Anatolian Project in Turkey, in POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS, supra 
note 3, at 279. 
108. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 126-29; Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 205-06; 
Saleh, supra note 2, at 74; Wachtel, supra note 14, at 365. Daniel Hillel gives the storage 
capacity as an enormous 82 BCM. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 106. 
109. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 122. 
110. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 105; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 125, 127, 131, 134; Chalabi 
& Majzoub, supra note 13, at 204; Cohen, supra note 13, at 508; Gruen, supra note 20, at 
101-03; Joffe, supra note 20, at 75; Kolars, supra note 11, at 106; Kolars, supra note 48, at 
67; Waterbury, supra note 49, at 54. 
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000,000 needed for the GAP solely from internal sources. 111 The lack 
of international financing has slowed the pace of developing the project, 
particularly as regards extending irrigation as promised. Turkey further 
suffered from the Gulf War because before that war Turkey was Iraq's 
largest trading partner. 112 Since late 1990, no trade has been allowed 
between Iraq and Turkey. This reality has cost Turkey its primary 
source of oil and the revenues accruing to it as the major marketing outlet 
for Iraqi oil exported to Europe. 113 Turkey's response of seeking 
greater economic integration into Europe has not thus far improved the 
opportunities for external financing of the GAP. 
Being upstream, Turkey is in the strong position of having the 
physical capacity to block the flow of the water down to Iraq and Syria 
should Turkey decide to do so with the latter two states being able to do 
little about it short of war. 114 Turkey, however, has the largest and 
best armed military in the region after Iraq's military was seriously 
weakened by the Gulf War, making a military response unlikely. 115 In 
fact, some observers have noted that Turkey tends to exploit its dams for 
political advantage rather than merely using them to achieve its economic 
goals. These observers contend that Turkey has cut the flow of the 
Euphrates in order to pressure Syria to cut-off its support to Kurdish 
rebels in Turkey. 116 Should Turkey abuse its dominant position, Iraq, 
and to a lesser extent Syria, will have to depend on law to protect their 
rights in the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris, if these rights are to 
be protected at all, ironic as that might seem in light of Iraq's own 
dismal record towards compliance with internationallaw. 117 
111. KuoT, supra note 2, at 125, 130-31; Cohen, supra note 13, at 507; Gruen, supra 
note 20, at 102; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 17; Waterbury, supra note 49, at 55-56. 
112. KLIOT, supranote2, at 165-66; WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 100. 
113. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 166, 170; WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 
100; Waterbury, supra note 49, at 55. The breaking of the trade ties has freed Turkey to 
renew its claims to the largely Kurdish (and oil-rich) Mosul area, claims complicated by 
Kurdish desires for independence. See Daniel Pipes, Hot Spot: Turkey, Iraq, and Mosul, 2 
MIDDLE EAST Q. 65 (1995). 
114. KuoT, supra note 2, at 111. See also Waterbury, supra note 49, at 43. For the 
relationship of upstream and downstream riparians in another Middle Eastern context, see 
Dellapenna, Rivers as Legal Structures, supra note 1. 
115. Tvedt, supra note 8, at 19. See also KUOT, supra note 2, at 166-67; WATER IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 98-101; Waterbury, supra note 49, at 54. For the contrary 
view, see Calleigh, supra note 39, at 126; Cohen, supra note 13, at 516-18. 
116. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 164-65; Shapland, supra note 37, at 301, 304. 
117. See, e.g., Harry Almond, jr., Weapons, War and the Environment, 3 GEO. INT'L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 117 (1990); Louis Rene Beres, Iraqi Crimes during and after the Gulf War: 
The Imperative Response of International Law, 15 LOY.-L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 675 
(1993); Marc Caggiano, The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in Modern Warfare: 
Customary Substance over Conventional Form, 20 ENVTL. AFF. 479 (1993); Shulpi Gupta, 
Iraq's Environmental Warfare in the Persian Gulf, 6 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 251 
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G. The Situation on the Tigris 
Development along the Tigris came more slowly than along the 
Euphrates because the Tigris flows through a more hilly (and thus better 
watered) terrain. Further, slow development occurred because the Tigris 
is smaller than the Euphrates until it is well into to Iraq, and the flow of 
the Tigris is more variable from year to year than is the flow of the 
Euphrates. 118 Even though the same three states shared the main course 
of the Tigris in the same relationship, when disputes did emerge in the 
middle years of the twentieth century their focus was within each of the 
two major user nations (Iraq and Turkey) rather than across their 
borders. 119 Indeed, concerns about Tigris water in particular have 
played an important, albeit usually neglected, role in the vexing Kurdish 
question, for any independent Kurdistan would be a new riparian at least 
on the Tigris and possibly on the Euphrates as well, being downstream 
from Turkey and upstream from Iraq. This would expose the Iraqis to 
further demands on the water which they have been using, while Turkish 
Kurdistan includes the sites of several large dams planned by the Turks 
in fulfillment of the GAP project. 120 
While the situation on the Tigris is not yet so close to crisis as on the 
Euphrates, at least in part because of the Kurdish rebellion, Turkish 
development plans do call for the withdrawal of up to 7 BCM per year 
from the Tigris during the early twenty-first century, enough to pose 
further significant problems for Iraq. 121 When combined the impending 
negative water balance on the Euphrates, the Tigris developments would 
(1993); Anthony Leibler, Deliberate Wartime Environmental Damage: New Challenges for 
International Law, 23 CAL. W. INIL L. REV. 68 (1992); Liesbeth Lijnzaad & Gerard Tanja, 
Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict: The Iraq-Kuwait War, 40 NETH. 
INIL L. REV. 169 (1993); Marc Ross, Environmental Warfare and the Persian Gulf War: 
Possible Remedies to Combat Intentional Destruction of the Environment, 10 DICK. J. INT'L 
L. 515 (1992); Carolyn Stannard, Legal Protection of the Environment in Wartime, 14 SYDNEY 
L. REV. 373 (1992); Rex Zedalis, Burning of the Kuwaiti Oilfields and the Laws of War, 24 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 711 (1991). 
118. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 110; Cressey, supra note 9, at 450-51, 458; Kolars, supra 
note 11, at 117; Saleh, supra note 2, at 69. 
119. Joffe, supra note 20, at 75-76; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 17. 
120. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 37-38, 104-05; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 125, 165; Clor, 
supra note 83, at 36-37; Jansen, supra note 100, at 12-13; Kolars, supra note 48, at 84-85; 
Tvedt, supra note 8, at 17-18. On the Kurdish revolt generally, see John Darnton, Discontent 
Seethes in Once-Stable Turkey, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1995, at A1, A8; Eric Rouleau, The 
Challenges to Turkey, 72 FoREIGN AFF., 110, 122-25 (No.5, 1993). On one aspect of the 
Turkish response-a demand for the session of oil-rich Kurdish areas in Iraq to Turkey, see 
Pipes, supra note 113. 
121. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 130; Kolars, supra note 11, at 108. 
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place Iraq in an impossible situation. These developments would also 
create an ecological disaster in the upper Persian Gulf. 122 
Despite its contributions to the waters flowing in the Tigris basin, 
Iran has never been a major player in exploiting those waters. John 
Kolars has commented that " [ o ]fall the countries in the Middle East, Iran 
has had the least hydrologic involvement with its neighbors. "123 Still, 
Iran's future plans for hydrologic development are even more shrouded 
in secrecy than is characteristic of other national communities in the 
region. Should Iran at some point begin to extract considerable water 
from the tributaries that arise within its borders, the situation in Iraq 
would be even more desperate. 
H. The "Peace Pipeline" 
The situation in Turkey, particularly the Kurdish revolt but also the 
unwillingness of the international community to help finance the GAP, 
have prevented Turkey from developing uses for all the water from these 
rivers that it is beginning to store behind its mammoth dams. Turkey has 
responded by seeking markets for the water it has impounded, both as a 
means of earning income and also to increase its political leverage in the 
region. 124 Most of these proposals involve variations of what has come 
to be called the "Peace Pipeline. "125 This proposal, in its most ambi-
tious form, would provide as much as 6 MCM daily to be piped as far 
as Jeddah and Mecca in Saudi Arabia (1.5 MCM) in a western branch 
and as far as Bahrain and Qatar (2.5 MCM) in a eastern branch. 126 
The Peace Pipeline proposal is based upon the conclusion that the 
water facilities already in place in Turkey-principally the Atatiirk 
122. Kolars, supra note II, at 108. 
123. /d., at 118. 
124. /d., at 119. 
125. See generally BEAUMONT, BLAKE, & WAGSTAFF, supra note 3, at 84; HILLEL, supra 
note 2, at 243-46; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 131-37, 163; Cern Duna, Turkey Peace Pipeline, 
in THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY: WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST 119 (Joyce Starr & Daniel Stoll 
eds. 1988); George Gruen, Contribution of Water Imports to lsraeli-Palestinian-Jordanian 
Peace, in WATER AND PEACE, supra note 14, at 273, 280-84; Chris Hellier, Draining the 
Rivers Dry, GEOGRAPHICAL MAG. 32, 34-35 (July 1990); Kolars, supra note II, at 117; Hillel 
Shuval, Approaches to Resolving the Water Conflicts between Israel and her Neighbors-A 
Regional Water-for-Peace Plan, 17 WATER INIL 133, 139-41 (1992); Itar Turan, Turkey and 
the Middle East: Problems and Solutions, 18 WATER INT'L 23, 26-27 (1993); Wachtel, supra 
note 14. For a wide-ranging criticism of the project, see Manuel Schiffler, Sustainable 
Development of Water Resources in Jordan: Ecological and Economic Aspects in a Long-Term 
Perspective, in LEGAL, POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL IMPLICATIONS, supra note 13, at 239, 
251. 
126. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 246; Gruen, supra note 125, at 281. 
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Dam-will develop more water than can be consumed in Turkey without 
interfering with the equitable shares of Iraq and Syria. Turkish estimates 
of the amount of water exploitable from all drainage basins in Turkey is 
about 96 BCM, a figure that still allows Turkey to consume about five 
times as much water per capita as current levels of consumption, even 
assuming that Turkey's population grows above 80,000,000 by 
2010. 127 These figures allow a fairly confident prediction of as much 
as 43 BCM as "surplus" water, available for export annually. 128 
Any version of the Peace Pipeline depends on Syria's on-going 
cooperation. 129 This is unlikely unless on-going incentives for Syrian 
cooperation are built into the arrangement. 130 This perhaps explains 
why the Turkish planners expected to deliver 1.1 MCM ( 18%) to Syrian 
cities out of 6 MCM to be pumped daily through the pipeline under the 
most ambitious proposal. 131 Less ambitious proposals for a pipeline 
from Turkey only to the Jordan Valley also include substantial deliveries 
to the Syrians (275 MCM out of 1.1 BCM annually). 132 In addition, 
Syria could generate hydroelectric power from the fall of the pipeline as 
it crosses Syrian territory, perhaps as much as 200 megawatts. 133 An 
Israeli analyst, Hillel Shuval, has gone so far as to propose that the 
pipeline provide water only to Syria, on the assumption that water could 
then be released from Syrian diversions from the Yarmuk River would 
satisfy Jordanian and Palestinian needs. 134 
127. Gruen, supra note 125, at 280. See generally BEAUMONT, BLAKE, & WAGSTAFF, 
supra note 3, at 84; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 133-37. 
128. Gruen, supra note 125, at 280; Kolars, supra note 11, at 117. 
129. "Medusa bags"-enormous plastic bags filled with water-have been suggested as 
a means for carrying the water from a Turkish port to an Israeli port, and thus literally 
circumventing the Syrian problem. This proposal seems simply too expensive to be taken 
seriously. See HILLEL, supra note 2, at 250-51; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 133, 240; Gruen, 
supra note 125, at 282-84; Hugh Pope, Water in a Bag, 8 MIDDLE EAST INT-L 14 (1990). 
See also Turan, supra note 125, at 27 (describing a plan to transport water to Israel by tanker). 
For a more optimistic estimate, see Elisha Kally, Costs of Inter-Regional Conveyance of Water 
and Costs of Sea Water Desalination, in WATER AND PEACE, supra note 14, at 289, 292-95. 
130. See generally ROBERT KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER 
167 (1989); Eyal Benvenisti, Legal Aspects of International Institutions for the Management 
of Shared Water Resources, in JOINT MANAGEMENT OF SHARED AQUIFERS: THE FIRST 
WORKSHOP 72, 75-77 (Eran Feitelson& Marwan Haddad eds. 1994); Robert Powell, Absolute 
and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory, 84 AM. POLl. SCI. REV. 1303 (1991). 
131. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 133; Duna, supra note 125, at 120; Gruen, supra note 125, 
at 281. 
132. KOLARS & MITCHELL, supra note 14, at 90; Gruen, supra note 125, at 282; 
Wachtel, supra note 14, at 363, 365, 368-69, 373. 
133. Wachtel, supra note 14, at 368. 
134. Shuval, supra note 125, at 140. 
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Despite Turkey's plans for exploiting the Euphrates and even 
without the Peace Pipeline, Syria will receive enough water for its current 
plans so long as Syria feels free to disregard any obligation to deliver 
adequate amounts of water to Iraq. 135 With so much of the water to be 
used for irrigation in Turkey, however, Syria will likely face severe 
degradation of water quality in the Euphrates and in the tributaries that 
feed into the Euphrates in Iraq. 136 And with its population currently 
growing at a rate that will double it every 18 years, 137 even the quantity 
of water available to Syria could well prove problematic in the not very 
distant future. 
The dependence of the project on Syrian as well as Turkish good will 
perhaps explains why Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States have proven 
distinctly uninterested in the Peace Pipeline proposal. 138 With their 
disinterest, financing the project becomes problematic except perhaps as 
part of the overall Middle East peace process. Even then, the project yet 
again takes water out of the Euphrates, threatening Iraq with no 
compensating benefits that could alleviate Iraqi concerns. Even if, as has 
been suggested, the water to be exported were to be drawn from the 
Ceyhan and Seyhan Rivers or even from other rivers, rather than directly 
from the Euphrates, that arrangement would not seriously relieve Iraqi 
fears as Euphrates water would probably be used directly or indirectly to 
replace the exported water. 139 Furthermore, water sources that might 
serve as alternatives to the Euphrates would require so much more 
pumping than the higher Atatiirk Dam that these sources would probably 
not be economically feasible. 140 For now, the grander version of the 
peace pipeline seems stillborn; it remains to be seen whether the more 
modest proposal to export water to the Jordan Valley will be realized. 
135. Kolars, supra note 11, at 115-16. 
136. WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 87-89, 97; Kolars, supra note 11, 
at 115. 
137. Kolars, supra note 11, at 115. 
138. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 246; Jamil al-Alawi & Mohammed Abdulrazzak, Water in 
the Arabian Peninsula: Problems and Perspectives, in WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD, supra 
note 2, at 171, 196-97; Gruen, supra note 125, at 282; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 19. 
139. KuoT, supra note 2, at 132; Gruen, supra note 125, at 282-83; Wachtel, supra note 
14, at 365-67. 
140. Wachtel, supra note 14, at 366. 
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IV. THE LAW OF THE RIVERS 
The entire basin of the Euphrates and most of the basin of the Tigris 
became part of the Ottoman Empire early in the sixteenth century and 
remained under Ottoman rule until 1918. 141 During this time, there 
could be no international disputes over the Euphrates, and, given the 
modest scale of usage, there appear to have been few or no international 
disputes between the Ottoman and Safavid Empires (modern Turkey and 
Iran) regarding use of the Tigris River. Although several treaties that 
attempted to define the boundary between the Ottomans and the Safavids 
between 1847 and 1914 did deal, though not altogether clearly, with a 
boundary line in the Shatt al-' Arab itself, even these treaties were not 
concerned with consumptive uses of water. 142 
The British conquered Mesopotamia during World War I; after the 
war, the region was partitioned between a British Mandate over Iraq, a 
French Mandate over Syria, and a residual portion left to Turkey. This 
was the origin of the present state structure in the basin. This section 
examines the several efforts to remedy this lack either through customary 
international law or through negotiation and agreement among the several 
interested states. First, I will explain the background of arguably 
controlling agreements that emerged between the end of World War I and 
the dispute over the Tabqa Dam, and show why those agreements fail to 
prevent or resolve disputes over the shared waters of the basin. Second, 
I shall discuss the customary international law governing consumptive 
uses of trans boundary waters, describe the general practices described as 
customary international law in this regard,a dn examine the customary 
law as developed in the disputes over the waters of the two rivers of the 
Mesopotamian basin. 
141. Kaiyan Homi Kaidobad, The Shatt-al-Arab River Boundary: A Legal Reappraisal, 
56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49, 52 (1988). 
142. Protocol of Constantinople, signed Nov. 17, 1913, Persia-Turkey, reprinted in (Iraqi) 
Ministry of Foreign Aff., Iraqi Letter to the Secretary-General, Nov. 29, 1934, 1935 LG. NAT. 
0.1. 16, App. 2 ("Iraqi Letter"); Treaty of Erzerum, reprinted in 101 CLIVE PARRY, 
CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES 86; & in Iraqi Letter, supra, App. 1. See generally 
CAPONERA, supra note 7, at 202-04; WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 2, at 101-06, 
176-77; C.J. Edmonds, The Iraqi-Persian Frontier: 1639-1938, 62 ASIAN AFF. 147 (1975); 
Kaidobad, supra note 39; Elihu Lauterpacht, River Boundaries: Legal Aspects of the Shatt at 
Arab Frontier, 9 INIL & CaMP. L.Q. 208 (1960); Alexander Melamid, The Shatt al-'Arab 
Boundary Dispute, 22 MIDDLE EAST J. 351 (1968); Daniel Pipes, A Border Adrift: Origin of 
the Conflict, in THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR: NEW WEAPONS, OLD CONFLICTS 13 (S. Tahir-Kheli 
& S. Ayubi eds. 1983). 
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A. Treaties before Active Disputes Began: 1918-1974 
Even after the division of Mesopotamia among three states, no 
serious disputes arose until Syria announced its plans for the Tabqa 
Dam. 143 Prior to that time, the uses of the several states simply were 
not sufficiently competitive for them to codify their relationships 
regarding, or seriously dispute the rights to, the water. The dispute 
between Iraq and Syria over the Tabqa Dam focused attention on the law 
of the rivers in a way never before attempted. The Turkish projects and 
proposals have further accentuated this attention. 
During the Mandate period, the British and the French included 
promises to consult over their uses of the rivers, and established a 
consultative committee for this purpose. 144 France and Turkey reached 
an agreement in 1921 in which each promised to use only an equitable 
share of the available water, but that agreement only pertained to the 
Kuveik River which flows from Turkey to northwestern Syria, disap-
pearing into the desert without reaching the sea. 145 The same agree-
ment authorized the city of Aleppo in Syria to "organize, at its own 
expense," a water supply from the Euphrates in Turkey. 146 A treaty 
signed by France and Turkey in 1926 was no more specific. 147 The 
Commission on the Delimitation of the Turkish-Syrian Frontier simply 
declared that "[a]ll questions [relating to the Tigris River), such as 
navigation, fishing, industrial and agricultural utilization of the waters, 
and the policing of the river, shall be resolved on the basis of complete 
equality." 148 Rather than establishing a regime for the twin rivers, 
these highly general agreements signaled the utter lack of interest in 
either Syria or Turkey in developing the waters of the Euphrates and the 
Tigris at that time. 149 
143. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 161. For the Tabqa Dam dispute, see the text supra at notes 
80-86. 
144. Convention on Certain Points Connected to the Mandates of Syria, the Lebanon. 
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L.N.T.S. 353. See Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 193. 
145. Agreement with a View to Promoting Peace, signed Oct. 20, 1921, France-Turkey, 
art. 12, 14 L.N.T.S. 177. See Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 193, 195-96. 
146. Agreement, supra note 143, art. 13. 
147. Treaty of Friendship and Good Neigborliness. signed May 30, 1926, France-Turkey, 
art. 13, 56 L.N.T.S. 194. See Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 193. 
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May 3, 1930, France-Turkey, cl. 2, UNITED NATIONS, LEGISLATIVE TEXTS AND TREATY 
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At a time when Syria and Turkey had no interest in developing the 
waters of Mesopotamia, Iraq was vitally interested. This pattern gave 
rise to two treaties between Iraq and Turkey, one in 1930 (while Iraq was 
still under the British mandate) in which each promised not to change the 
flow of the Euphrates without the consent of the other, and the second in 
ffi . h l' t 150 1946 (after the Mandate ended) rea rmmg t e ear 1er agreemen . 
Turkey promised not to alter the rivers without informing Iraq, and to 
b h " f 'bl ,151 conform its works to the needs of the ot states as ar as poss1 e. 
Turkey consented to Iraq's construction of dams in Turkey to regulate 
the flow of the rivers in Iraq. 152 Arguably, the effect of these treaties 
was Turkish acceptance of Iraq's vested right to receive its then 
established uses, about 13 BCM. 153 
These treaties gradually fell in desuetude. Iraq never constructed the 
works in Turkey that the 1946 treaty had anticipated, perhaps because 
Iraq was unwilling to have its major water control facilities located 
outside its borders. 154 A meeting of representatives of the three states 
in 1965 signaled only the demise of the treaty system. 155 In follow-up 
bilateral talks, Syria expressly rejected any recognition of vested rights 
by Iraq. 156 No new agreement replaced the earlier treaties. Thereafter, 
each state began to construct new works without the consent of the other 
parties. 
The two consultative committees continued to meet intermittently, 
and eventually, in 1983, the two consultative committees were merged 
into a Trilateral Commission on the Tigris and the Euphrates .157 That 
Commission, which has only met sporadically, has been strictly limited 
to technical matters. None of the three states has attempted to involve 
the Trilateral Commission in their political disputes relating to the 
Euphrates or to the Tigris. 158 
Between 1946 and 1990, the three states did not enter into any 
formal treaty relative to their shared waters. With the apparent 
abandonment of any claims they might have had under the earlier treaties, 
150. Protocol Relative to the Regulation of the Waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, signed 
Mar. 29, 1946, Iraq-Turkey, art. 4, 37 U.N.T.S. 280. See Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, 
at 194-95. 
151. Protocol, supra note 150, art. 5. 
152. /d., art. 6. 
153. Waterbury, supra note 49, at 56. See also Hager, supra note 2, at 214-15. 
154. Waterbury, supra note 49, at 56. 
155. /d.; Bari, supra note 42, at 238. 
156. Waterbury, supra note 49, at 56-57. 
157. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 162; Gruen, supra note 20, at 100; Waterbury, supra note 
49, at 57. 
158. Gruen, supra note 20, at 100-01; Joffe, supra note 20, at 76. 
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the states have, in fact, no formal agreement allocating the waters of the 
two rivers. 159 As we shall see, the claims, discussions, and recrimina-
tions that make up the customary international law process have given 
rise to several informal agreements. Whether these will provide a more 
stable region for the waters of the basin remains to be seen. 
B. The Customary International Law of Trans boundary Waters 
International law is in many respects still a relatively primitive legal 
system, i.e. a system that mostly lacks centralized institutional structures 
for law-making and law-enforcing, relying instead on the decentralized 
processes of self-help, agreement, and custom. 160 The system of 
international law in fact is so primitive that some question whether it 
deserves to be called law at all. 161 This question only arises when 
people have a very specific model of how law works when they describe 
something as a legal right or obligation. 162 This model envisions a 
legislative act formally creating a highly determinate rule enforced by a 
policeman on the corner who will "take you in" if you violate the "law." 
However, this model does not go very far in explaining how "law" 
actually works. 
Consider mundane examples of traffic laws. In the United States, 
nearly everyone drives faster than the legal speed limit and there could 
never be enough police to compel people to drive at or below the legal 
limit. In fact, if the government ever attempted to strictly enforce the 
speed limit, it would fail simply because too many people are breaking 
the law. The best the government can do is to keep most people driving 
enforce the limits on a case-by-case basis through selective enforcement 
targeted particularly at those who drive very fast. 163 In spite of this 
enforcement procedure, however, it is difficult to imagine that one would 
be allowed to defend their speeding to a judge on the basis that the law 
159. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 161. See also WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, 
at 99. 
160. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-96 (1961); MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 45-46 (1988); WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 
157-60; Yoram Dinstein, International Law as a Primitive Legal System, 19 INT'L L. & 
POLITICS 1 ( 1986). 
161. The question was apparently first asked in the nineteenth century by John Austin. 
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 122-25 (H.L.A. Hart ed. 
1955). 
162. See generally Robert MacLean, Does Anyone Still Ask the Question: "Is International 
Law Really Law?", 1991 JURIDICAL REV. 230. 
163. See Note, Laws That Are Made to Be Broken: Adjusting for Anticipated Noncompli-
ance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 687 (1977). 
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is not effectively enforced or that the designated speed limit is not the 
law. 
Contrast the situation regarding traffic lights. If nearly every one 
were to disregard traffic signals, the laws proscribing driving through red 
lights could no more be enforced than the speed limits. Yet people in the 
United States seldom drive through red lights, even though many people 
often cheat a little. When only a few violate a rule, a small number of 
police are adequate to enforce the rule against the violators. The reason 
most people do not drive through red lights is self-evident: To drive 
through a red light is more dangerous than speeding, and would be 
suicidal if nearly every one did so. Yet one's emotional response to 
another's driving through a red light is not simply that it is dangerous. 
Most people perceive it as anti-social behavior; they condemn it as 
illegal, and not simply as stupid. 
This social sense of legitimacy makes true law-even in paradigm 
situations of clear rules and vigorous official enforcement, more so than 
John Austin's "command of a sovereign" or any ensuing enforce-
ment. 164 As A.L. Goodhart stated, "It is because a rule is regarded as 
obligatory that a measure of coercion may be attached to it; it is not 
obligatory because there is coercion." 165 H.L.A. Hart's notion of law 
as growing out of a "habit of obedience" 166 seems inadequate to capture 
this sense of legitimacy, but it is closer to the reality of what makes for 
law than the notion of command or sanction that are often thought to 
constitute "the law." 167 
International law operates on much the same basis, but without the 
superstructure of specialize institutions-executive, legislative, and 
judicial-with which we are familiar in modern national legal systems. 
This lack has led some to believe that the international system does not 
have law. The conclusion confuses particular institutional arrangements 
with what law really is and how it really operates. Those institutions are 
have proven useful, and perhaps even necessary, in large communities, 
and corresponding institutions may yet have to be developed in an 
international system with increasing numbers of states and other 
participants. Yet the absence of those institutions no more indicates an 
164. AUSTIN, supra note 161, at 133, 201. This notion of law can be traced back at least 
as far as Hobbes in the seventeenth century. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651). 
165. A.L. GOODHART, LAW AND THE MORAL LAW 17 (1953). See also HART, supra 
note 160, at 20-25. 
166. See HART, supra note 160, at 77-96. 
167. See generally G.G. Fitzmaurice, The Foundations of the Authority of International 
Law, 19 Moo. L. REV. 1 (1956). 
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absence of law in the international system than the absence of those 
institutions indicated the lack of law in pre-industrial societies the world 
over.I6s 
In the absence of formal treaty, international law arises through a 
process of claim and counter-claim that produces an explicit or implicit 
agreement of the participants to the controversy. 169 If nothing more 
were involved, one might well question whether we were talking about 
anything that could properly be termed law. States on both sides of a 
controversy, however, will refer to international law as a primary 
justification of their claims and their practices. Foreign ministries and 
diplomats know very well the difference between appeals to law and 
appeals to morality, and they often express this difference at appropriate 
points in their discourse. 170 This reference to law ties the customary 
practice to a sense of legitimacy, and constitutes the practice as law in a 
highly decentralized and institutionally undeveloped system like 
international law or, for that matter, customary law among substance 
farmers or nomadic tribesmen. 171 A consistent pattern of behavior 
joined with the sense that the practice is legally obligatory (the opinio 
juris) is what international lawyers mean by saying that a pattern of state 
behavior has become customary international law. 172 
168. MICHAEL BARKUN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS (1968); VICTOR Ll, LAW WITHOUT 
LAWYERS (1978); Cornelius Murphy, Some Reflections upon Theories Concerning the Nature 
of Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 447 (1970). 
169. WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, 158-162, 167. The classic description 
of this process is found in Myres McDougal & Norbert Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Test in 
Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955). See also CHARLES DE 
VISSHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1968). 
170. A point made by H.L.A. Hart more than 30 years ago. See HART, supra note 160, 
at 222-225. 
171. See 1 PITT COBBET, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1922); DE VISSHER, supra 
note 169, at 149. See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-32 
(4th ed. 1990); ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 51, 
88 (1971); HART, supra note 160, at 77-96; KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 52-56, 160-68 (2d rev. ed. 1993); Martti Koskennienmi, The Normative Force 
of Habit: International Custom and Social Theory, 1 FINN. Y.B. INIL L. 77 (1990). 
172. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993 
(1945) ("ICJ Statute"); J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 60 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed. 
1963). See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 171, at 4-11; D' AMATO, supra note 171; JANIS, 
supra note 160, at 35-46; HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 368-93 (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 102 (Louis Henkin, Andreas Lowenfeld, & Detlev 
Vagts reporters 1987); G.!. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 89-203 (William Butler 
trans. 1974); 1 J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 31-47 
(1968). 
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Customary international law frequently remains ill-defined and 
uncertain, as is true of all customary law. 173 Proving that a practice 
has crystallized as customary international law and the precise content of 
any such custom is difficult, requiring research into the professed reasons 
for state practices in often obscure sources. For this reason, states and 
international tribunals often have recourse to the learning of leading 
scholars (termed "the most highly qualified publicists" in the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice) to discover the actual customary 
international law. 174 There are numerous sources of state practice and 
of evidence of the reasons for that practice. A widespread pattern of 
treaties or other international agreements demonstrate not only the 
agreement of the specific parties, but also that the practice is so widely 
followed that it has become a rule of customary law binding even on 
states that are not parties to any such treaty. 175 One might also find 
votes in international assemblies176 or decisions by international courts 
or international arbitrators 177 equally useful. Even unilateral actions of 
states demonstrate that a particular state embraces a particular customary 
rule of law. 178 
Yet even when a norm of customary international law has been 
determined with some certainty, customary forms of enforcement-claim 
and counterclaim among states-are not neutral enforcement mechanism. 
Without a neutral enforcement mechanism, one always suspects that 
national interest overrides any real commitment to law. Without a neutral 
enforcement mechanism, international law ultimately has nothing better 
173. See, e.g., MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 114 (L.A. Manyon trans. 1961); ERIC 
HAVELOCK, PREFACE TO PLATO 121-22 (1963); FRITZ KERN, KINGSHIP AND LAW IN THE 
MIDDLE AGES 179 (S.B. Chrimes trans. 1939); Ronald Collins & David Skover, Paratexts, 
44 STAN. L. REV. 509, 516-21 (1992). 
174. ICJ Statute, supra note 172, art. 38(1)(d). See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 171, 
at 24-25; JANIS, supra note 160, at 66-69; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 172, at 23-25. 
175. See BROWNLIE, supra note 171, at 11-14; JANIS, supra note 160, at 41-42; MYRES 
MCDOUGAL, HAROLD LASSWELL, & IVAN VLASIC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 82-82, 
115-19 (1963); A.D. MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 216-18 (1961); JULIUS STONE, LEGAL 
CONTROLS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (1954 ); Grigory Tunkin, Is Genera/International Law 
Customary Law Only?, 4 EUR. J. INIL L. 534 (1993). 
176. BROWNLIE, supra note 171, at 14-15, 30-31; BLAINE SLOAN, UNITED NATIONS 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS IN OUR CHANGING WORLD (1991); Christopher Joyner, 
U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: Rethinking the Contemporary 
Dynamics of Norm-Creation, 11 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 445 (1981); Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, 
International Economic "Soft-Law", 163 HAGUE RECUEIL DES COURSES 165, 194-213 (1979). 
177. BROWNLIE, supra note 171, at 19-24; JANIS, supra note 160, at 66-69; LAUTERPAC-
HT, supra note 172, at 1-25; SHABTAI ROSENNE, 2 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT 611-13 (1965); Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy of Sources in 
International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 273 (1975). 
178. BROWNLIE, supra note 171, at 5; JANIS, supra note 160, at 38-43. 
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to offer for punishing violations than the law of the vendetta. 179 
Despite its institutional primitiveness, however, customary international 
law has worked fairly well when there were only a few participants in the 
international community and their wants were relatively simple and 
straightforward. That continues today in the many areas in which 
customary international law operates without controversy. 18° Custom-
ary international law continues to empower international actors by 
legitimating their claims while also limiting the claims they can make. 
The institutional primitiveness of international law has always been felt 
most seriously during periods of major crisis, a problem that also 
continues today. 181 
In coupling of a recognized mode of expert analysis with woefully 
inadequate institutional development, customary international law has 
become seriously unbalanced. The "most highly qualified publicists" 
who figure so prominently in international legal processes often devise 
doctrinal schemes of considerable sophistication without being able to 
translate those schemes into effective institutional arrangements. 
Diplomats and politicians, responsible for crafting institutional arrange-
ments, have had predictably mixed results, rarely succeeding in institution 
building through customary processes. A fully developed institutional 
framework is essential for any region facing increasingly desperate water 
shortages. 182 Institution builders, to get beyond the limits of custom, 
must combine the sophisticated insights of international lawyers with the 
practical structures created by political actors through treaties creating 
institutions appropriate for managing cooperative activities and for 
resolving conflict before its escalates to injurious levels. 
179. WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 161. See also Richard Bilder, Some 
Limitations of Adjudication as an International Dispute Settlement Technique, 23 VA. J. INT' L 
L. 1 (1982); Richard Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 AM. 
J. lNT'L L. 415 (1969). 
180. See generally LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 25-26,47, 89-98, 320-21 (2d 
ed. 1979); Ian Brownlie, The Reality and Efficacy of International Law, 52 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L 
L. 1 (1981). For a study of customary law in a domestic setting relating to water, see Sanford 
Clark, Tensions between Water Legislation and Customary Rights, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 503 
(1990). 
181. HANS MORGANTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 282 (4th ed. 1967); Richard Falk, 
The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law-Gaps in Legal Thinking, 50 
VA. L. REV. 231 (1964). 
182. See generally Dellapenna, Designing Legal Structures, supra note 1, at 93-103; 
Dellapenna, Jordan Valley, supra note 1, at 40-45; Dellapenna, Treaties, supra note 1, at 51-
56; Northcutt Ely & Abel Wolman, Administration, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
DRAINAGE BASINS 124 (Albert Garretson, Robert Hayton, & Cecil Olmstead eds. 1967) 
("INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS"); TECLAFF, supra note 2, at 113-203. 
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In short, customary international law, by itself, is unable to solve 
such contentious problems as the managing of transboundary water 
resources. 183 Yet even for the managing of transboundary water 
resources, the pattern of state claim and counterclaim, and of state 
behavior intended to make such claims remains consistent, and of ultimate 
outcomes is, in general terms, entirely predictable, 184 even though all 
states agree on only one point: Only riparian states-states along the 
boundary of which, or through which, a river flows-have any legal 
right, absent agreement, to use the water of a river. 185 Otherwise, the 
patterns of international claim and counterclaim initially diverge sharply 
according to the riparian status of the state making the claim. 
The uppermost-riparian state initially claims "absolute territorial 
sovereignty", 186 typically claiming the right to do whatever it chooses 
183. See Dellapenna, Designing Legal Structures, supra note 1, at 85-90; Joseph 
Dellapenna, Surface Water in the Iberian Peninsula: An Opportunity for Cooperation or a 
Source of Conflict?, 59 TENN. L. REV. 803, 814-22 (1992); Dellapenna, Jordan Valley, supra 
note 1, at 37-40; Dellapenna, Treaties, supra note 1, at 33-42. 
184. For illustrative works on the law of transboundary surface waters, see lnt'l L. 
Comm'n, Draft Articles on the Law of Non-Navigational Use of International Watercourses 
("Draft Articles"), art. 4, in REPORT OF THE 46TH MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMMISSION, 2 MAY- 22 JULY, 1994, A/49/10 ("JLC REPORT"), at 195; BERBER, supra note 
7; BRIERLY, supra note 172, at 231-32; BROWNLIE, supra note 171, at 271-76; J. BRUHACS, 
THE LAW OF NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES (1993); 
CAPONERA, supra note 7, at 189-90, 212-14; BRIJ CHAUHAN, SETTLEMENT OF WATER LAW 
DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS (1981); BONAYA ADHI GODANA, AFRICA'S 
SHARED WATER RESOURCES: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE NILE, NIGER, AND 
SENEGAL RIVER SYSTEMS 32-35 (1985); 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 313, 345-
47, 474-476 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955); H.A. SMITH, THE ECONOMIC USES OF 
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS (1931); TECLAFF, supra note 8; Eyal Benvenisti & Haim Gvirtzman, 
Harnessing International Law to Determine Israeli-Palestinian Water Rights: The Mountain 
Aquifer, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 543 (1993); Richard Bilder, International Law and Natural 
Resources Policies, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 452 (1980); Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13; 
Jan Hostie, Problems of International Law Concerning Irrigation of Arid Lands, 31 INT'L 
AFFAIRS 61 (1955); Jerome Lipper, Equitable Utilization, in INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE 
BASINS, supra note 182, at 18; Tiyanjana Maluwa, Towards an Internationalisation of the 
Zambezi River Regime: The Role of International Law in the Common Management of an 
International Watercourse, 25 COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 20 (1992); Stephen Schwebel, 
The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/348, 
[1982] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 73, 76-82; Albert Utton, International Streams and Lakes 
Generally, in 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, ch. 49 (Robert Beck ed. 1991); Patricia 
Wouters, Allocation of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Efforts at 
Codification and the Experience of Canada and the United States, 30 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 43, 
45 (1992); Sheng Yu, International Rivers and Lakes, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 989, 990 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed. 1991). 
185. Draft Articles, supra note 184, art. 4; WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, 
at 166-167. 
186. BERBER, supra note 7, at 14-19,77-78, 108; BRUHAcs, supra note 184, at 41-47; 
CAPONERA, supra note 7, at 212-13; GODANA, supra note 184, at 32-35 (1985); WATER IN 
THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 164-165; Lipper, supra note 184, at 20-23; Maluwa, supra 
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with the water regardless of its effect on other riparian states. Down-
stream states generally open by claiming a right to the "absolute integrity 
of the river", 187 claiming that upper-riparian states can do nothing that 
affects the quantity or quality of water that flows down the watercourse. 
Of course, neither claim can prevail, although the process of negotiating 
or otherwise arriving at a solution could require decades. 
The usual solution is found in a concept of "restricted sovereign-
ty" .188 States that find themselves to be both upper and lower riparians 
on the same stream (usually relative to different states) often are the first 
to adopt a theory of restricted sovereign rights under which each state 
recognizes the right of all riparian states to use some water from a 
common source and the obligation to manage their uses so as not to 
interfere with like uses in other riparian states. States often allocate 
water under this theory according to some selected historic pattern of use, 
although occasionally some other more or less objective measure of need 
is advanced (population, area, arable land, etc.). 189 At the extreme, the 
note 184, at 25-26; Stephen McCaffrey, Second Report on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/348, [1986] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 88, 
105-10; Utton, supra note 184, § 49.02(1); Yu, supra note 184, at 990. Probably the best 
known expression of this theory is in a published opinion by U.S. Attorney-General Judson 
Harmon, 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274, 281-282 (1898). The "Harmon Doctrine" has been 
disapproved by the U.S. State Department, Memorandum to the Legal Advisor, Nov. 23, 1942, 
in 3 MARJORIE WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 950-954 (1964). 
187. BERBER, supra note 7, at 19-22; BRUHACS, supra note 184, at 43-47; CAPONERA, 
supra note 7, at 213; GOD ANA, supra note 184, at 38-39; WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra 
note 1, at 165; A.P. Lester, River Pollution in International Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 828, 832 
(1963); Lipper, supra note !84, at 18-20; Maluwa, supra note 184, at 24-25; Utton, supra note 
184, § 49.02(2); Yu, supra note 184, at 990. 
188. BERBER, supra note 7, at 11-14, 78-79; BRUHAcs, supra note 184, at 45-48; 
CAPONERA, supra note 7, at 213-14; GODANA, supra note 184, at 40; WATER IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST, supra note 1, at 165-166; William Bush, Compensation and the Utilization of 
International Rivers and Lakes: The Role of Compensation in the Event of Permanent Injury 
to Existing Uses of Water, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS AND LAKES 309 
(Ralph Zacklin & Lucius Catlisch eds. 1981); Lipper, supra note 184, at 23-38; Maluwa, supra 
note 184, at 26-30; McCaffrey, supra note 186, at 110-33; Utton, supra note 184, § 49.02(3); 
Yu, supra note 184, at 991. 
189. See, e.g., Agreement on the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, signed Nov. 8, 1959, 
United Arab Rep.-Sudan, 453 U.N.T.S. 51; Convention Concerning the Management of the 
Chute of the Daubs near Chatelot, signed Nov. 19, 1930, France-Switzerland, UNITED 
NATIONS, LEGISLATIVE TEXTS AND TREATY PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE UTILIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS FOR OTHER PURPOSES THAN NAVIGATION no. 199, ST/LEG/SER.B/12 
(1964) ("LEGISLATIVE TEXTS"); Convention for the Development of the Water Power of the 
Rhone River, signed Oct. 4, 1913, France-Switzerland, LEGISLATIVE TEXTS, supra, no. 197; 
Convention Providing for the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande for 
Irrigation Purposes, signed May 21, 1906, Mexico-United States, 34 Stat. 2953; Convention 
to Regulate the Hydro-Electric Development of the International Section of the River Duoro, 
signed Aug. 11, 1927, Spain-Portugal, 82 L.N.T.S. 133; Indus Waters Treaty, signed Sept. 
19, 1960, India-Pakistan, 419 U.N.T.S. 126; Treaty Relating to the Uses of the Waters of the 
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theory of restricted sovereignty might be no more developed than the 
vague notion that each state is entitled to a "reasonable share" of the 
water. 190 
Restricted sovereignty has become the customary rule of international 
law under the rubric of "equitable utilization." The rule of equitable 
utilization has been applied in international judicial and arbitral 
awards, 191 adopted in innumerable treaties, 192 and supported by the 
near unanimous opinions of the most highly-qualified publicists. 193 
Every quasi-public international organization of lawyers, jurists, and 
scholars to consider the customary legal regime governing internationally 
shared water resources has embraced the concept of equitable utilization 
in one form or another. 194 Finally, the principle has been endorsed by 
Niagara River, signed Feb. 27, 1950, United States-Canada, 1 U.S.T. 694, T.I.A.S. No. 2130, 
132 U.N. T .S. 224; Treaty Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers 
and of the Rio Grande, signed Feb. 3, 1944, Mexico-United States, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 
994, 3 U.N.T.S. 313. See also SAMIR SALIBA, THE JORDAN RIVER DISPUTE 51-54, 57-59 
(1968); TECLAFF, supra note 2, at 157-165; TECLAFF, supra note 7, at 429-43; Richard 
Baxter, The Indus Basin, in INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supra note 182, at 443; Aziza 
Fahmi, International River Law for Non-Navigable Rivers with Special Reference to the Nile, 
23 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 39 (1967); Albert Garretson, The Nile Basin, 
in INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supra, at 256; Sayed Hosni, The Nile Regime, 17 
REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 70 (1961); Lipper, supra note 184, at 18, 49-
57. See generally Charles Meyers, The Colorado Basin, in INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE 
BASINS, supra, at 486. 
190. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning Frontier Rivers, signed Sept. 16, 1971, Finland-
Sweden, art. 5, 825 U.N.T.S. 191; Agreement Concerning the Utilization of the Rapids of the 
Uruguay River, signed Dec. 30, 1946, Argentina-Uruguay, art. 1, 671 L.N.T.S. 26; Agreement 
Relating to Frontier Watercourses, signed July 12, 1922, Denmark-Germany, art. 35, 10 
L.N.T.S. 221; Boundary Treaty, signed Apr. 9, 1935, El Salvador-Guatemala, art. 2, 189 
L.N.T.S. 295; Treaty Concerning the Hydroelectric Utilization of the Parana River, signed 
Apr. 26, 1973, Brazil-Paraguay, art. 13,923 U.N.T.S. 95; Treaty of Friendship, signed Feb. 
26, 1921, Persia-RussianS.F.S.R., art. 3, 9 L.N.T.S. 403; Treaty on Frontier Watercourses, 
signed Dec. 20, 1933, Brazil-Uruguay, art. 19, 181 L.N .T.S. 85. See generally Draft Articles, 
supra note 184, arts. 5-7. 
191. See, e.g., Case of the Territorial Jurisdiction of the Int'l Comm'n of the Oder River, 
[1929] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 23 at 27; The Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), 24 
I.L.R. 101, 139 (1957), digested in 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 156, 170 (1959); The Zarumilla River 
Arbitration (Ecuador v. Brazil), Informe de las Relaciones Exteriores a Ia Nacion 623 (Quito 
1946), translated in William Griffin, The Use of Waters of International Drainage Basins under 
Customary International Law, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 50, 61 (1959). See generally Utton, supra 
note 184, § 49.03(b). 
192. These are collected in BERBER, supra note 7; SMITH, supra note 184; Dellapenna, 
Treaties, supra note 1; Schwebel, supra note 184, at 76-82, 88-90; Utton, supra note 184, 
§ 49.03(a). 
193. See the authorities collected supra at note 184. 
194. INTER-AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, RESOLUTION ON PRINCIPLES OF LAW GOVERNING THE 
USES OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS AND LAKES (1957); INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 
UTILIZATION OF NON-MARITIME INTERNATIONAL WATERS (EXCEPT FOR NAVIGATION), art. 
2 (Sept. 4-13, 1961); INTERNATIONAL L. ASS'N, THE HELSINKI RULES ON THE USES OF THE 
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the International Law Commission, an organ of the United Nations 
designed to foster the progressive codification of customary international 
law, 195 has embraced the principle as the dominant norm in its Draft 
Articles on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. 196 
The Draft Articles provides as succinct a summary of the law as one can 
find today in two of its articles: 
Article 5 
Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation 
(1) Watercourse States shall in their respective territories 
utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and 
reasonable manner. In particular, an international water-
course shall be used and developed by watercourse States with 
a view to attaining optimal utilization thereof and benefits 
therefrom consistent with adequate protection in the water-
course. 
(2) Watercourse States shall participate in the use, develop-
ment and protection of an international watercourse in an 
equitable and reasonable manner. Such participation includes 
both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to 
cooperate in the protection and development thereof, as 
provided in the present articles. 
Article 7 
Obligation not to cause significant harm 
1. Watercourse States shall exercise due diligence to utilize 
an international watercourse in such a way as not to cause 
significant harm to other watercourse States. 
2. Where, despite the exercise of due diligence, significant 
harm is caused to another watercourse State, the State whose 
WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS {Rep. of the 52d Conf., adopted at Helsinki, Aug. 20, 
1966) ("Helsinki Rules"); INTERNATIONAL L. Ass'N, RESEARCH PROJECT ON THE LAW AND 
USES OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 197-98 (1959). 
195. On the structure and purposes of the International Law Commission, see THE WORK 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (4th ed. 1988); IAN SINCLAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW COMMISSION {1987). 
196. Draft Articles, supra note 184, arts. 5-7, 10. See also ECONOMIC COMM'N FOR 
EUROPE, Two DECADES OF Co-OPERATION ON WATER, U.N. Doc. ECE/ENVWA/2, at 1, 3 
(1988). 
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use causes the harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such 
use, consult with the State suffering such harm over: 
(a) the extent to which such use has proved equitable and 
reasonable taking into account the factors listed in article 
6; 
(b) the question of ad hoc adjustments to its utilization, 
designed to eliminate or mitigate any such harm caused 
and, where appropriate, the question of compensation. 
How one reconciles these two articles in their current form is not 
entirely clear. Former Special Rapporteur Stephen McCaffrey, the 
primary draftsman of the 1991 version of the Draft Articles, finds "no 
harm" rule of article 7 dominant over the "equitable utilization" rule of 
article 5. 197 A careful reading of article 7 suggests, to the contrary, 
that the "no harm" rule is subordinated to rule of "equitable utilization." 
McCaffrey himself even concedes that subsection 2 implies that a use 
causing significant harm is not "per sea breach of the state's internation-
al obligations," echoing the International Law Commission's official 
commentary on the revised article that a use causing significant harm 
"would not of itself necessarily constitute a basis for banning it." 198 
Article 7's subsection 1 recognizes only an obligation to use "due 
diligence" to avoid significant harm. Its subsection 2 declares an 
obligation for the state causing harm to consult with the injured state, but 
qualifies even that limited obligation by requiring consultation only over 
whether the harmful use is "equitable and reasonable" and over whether 
the harm might be reduced or prevented by "adjustments" to the way 
water is used. The reference to "the question of compensation" at the 
end of the subsection (2)(b) thus becomes highly ambiguous, 199 argu-
ably limiting the obligation to pay compensation to situations where the 
harmful use is neither equitable nor reasonable. Compensation appears to 
be "appropriate" only if adjustments to reduce or prevent an "inequitable 
or unreasonable" harm are not possible. The ambiguity arises because 
the International Law Commission presumably did not intend that there 
would be no obligation to consult over steps to avoid or minimize harm 
197. Stephen McCaffrey, The International Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles on 
International Watercourses, 89 AM. J. INIL L. 395, 399-401 (1995). 
198. ILC REPORT, supra note 184, at 236; McCaffrey, supra note 197, at 400. See also 
Richard Kyle Paisley & Timothy McDaniels, International Water Law, Acceptable Pollution 
Risk and the Tatshenshini River, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. Ill, 121 (1995). 
199. McCaffrey, supra note 197, at 400-01. 
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for uses that were "equitable and reasonable." This interpretive problem 
is resolved if one reads the second obligation-the obligation to consult 
over mitigating harm-as explanatory rather than as indicating some 
independent duty: If harm can be prevented or reduced by reasonable 
adjustments in the manner, place, or timing of use, the harmful use is 
neither equitable nor reasonable. If so, subsection (b)(2)'s function is 
to make explicit the obligation to compensate for "inequitable and 
unreasonable" uses; in other words, article 7 explicitly subordinates the 
"no harm" rule to the now clearly primary rule of equitable utilization 
found in article 5-a proposition endorsed by Robert Rosenstock, the 
Special Rapporteur who drafted the final version of the Draft Arti-
cles. 200 
This is no mere abstract debate over fine points of legal doctrine. A 
stronger "no harm" rule would prohibit any meaningful use by an upper-
riparian state, turning the rule into merely a variant form of the absolute 
integrity claim. Furthermore, as the state seeking to initiate a new use 
would generally be cast in the posture of the one creating the "injury," 
absolute integrity favors the more highly developed states at the expense 
of their less developed neighbors, particularly as the lower basin states 
tend to develop earlier and faster than upper basin states?01 Such a 
posture is hardly conducive to achieving the developmental equity 
proclaimed under various banners at the United Nations. The only 
equitable way to resolve such concerns is to allow each a reasonable and 
equitable share, rather than attempting to insist that a state's development 
of its waters not harm another state. As the German federal supreme 
court stated in The Danauversinkung Case (Wurttemberg v. Baden),202 
"[o]ne must consider not only the absolute injury caused to the neighbor-
200. Robert Rosenstock, The Forty-Ninth Session of the International Law Commission, 
89 AM. J. lNT'L L. 390, 392 (1995). 
201. I examine this point at some length in Dellapenna, Rivers, supra note 1. See also 
Charles Bourne, Principles and Planned Measures, 3 CoLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 65, 
92 (1992); Garretson, supra note 189, at 256, 264-65. See generally James Westcoat, jr., 
Beyond the River Basin: The Changing Geography of International Water Problems and 
International Watercourse Law, 3 CoLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 301 (1992). The 
exceptions generally occur in situations were a region is colonized by a technologically more 
developed culture from outside the region. Perhaps the most notable example is the United 
States relative to Mexico. See Alberto Szekely, "General Principles" and "Planned Measures" 
Provisions in the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses: A Mexican Point of View, 3 CoLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & 
PoL'Y 93 (1992). 
202. ANN. DIGEST & REP. OF PUB. !NT'L L. CASES 128 (Wrest. 1927). 
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ing State, but also the relation of the advantage gained by one to the 
injury caused to the other. "203 
C. Claims and Counter-Claims Relating to the Two Rivers 
Without either formal agreements or effective multilateral machinery 
regarding the international sharing of the waters of the two rivers, the 
states sharing the Mesopotamian basin have been left to the informal 
processes of claim and counter-claim that forms the method of customary 
international law. 204 In Mesopotamia, this has resulted in some oral 
agreements, the meaning of which, and even the existence of which, is 
disputed between the parties. And these agreements, such as they are, 
refer only to the Euphrates; there isn't even that much of an arrangement 
regarding the Tigris. 205 
Apparently the earliest actual recent promise to restrain one nation's 
use to assure water to the other riparian states was a promise by Turkey 
in 1964 to assure a flow of a mere 350 m3/sec of water in the Euphra-
tes. 206 During the Tabqa Dam dispute,2°7 Turkey increased its prom-
ised releases to 450 m3/sec,208 ostensibly as an accommodation to Syria, 
but actually to defuse possible protests over Turkey's own Keban Dam. 
Eventually, Syria also agreed to release an additional 200 MCM from 
Lake Assad to ameliorate the Iraqi complaints, but insisted that it did so 
as a favor and not because of any legal right in Iraq. 209 
Syria's legal position during the disputes with Iraq over the 
Euphrates took the form of the classic claim of absolute sovereignty.210 
This posture fit nicely with the Syrian claim of absolute sovereignty over 
the Banias Spring feeding the upper Jordan River, 211 but did not take 
into account that Syria was downriver from Turkey on both the Euphrates 
and the Tigris Rivers, as well as downriver from Lebanon on the Orontes 
203. See also Bourne, supra note 201, at 82-92; Schwebel, supra note 184, at 102; Utton, 
supra note 184, §§ 49.05, 49.06. 
204. Hager, supra note 2, at 215-17. 
205. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 161. 
206. /d. 
207. See the text supra at notes 80-86. 
208. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 161. 
209. !d., at 161-62; WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 94; Tvedt, supra note 
8, at 16. 
210. Calleigh, supra note 33, at 127; Cohen, supra note 13, at 512. 
211. SALIBA, supra note 189, at 144; WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 167-
68, 173-74; Dellapenna, Jordan Valley, supra note 1, at 41. 
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River. 212 Nor did this position sit well with Syria's position down-
slope on one or more aquifers shared with Turkey.213 Turkey's actions 
would shortly compel Syria to confront this neglect. 
When the Atatiirk Dam was closed in 1990, Turkey's Prime 
Minister pledged to assure a flow of the Euphrates of 500m3/sec through 
the Atatiirk Dam. 214 This rate of flow through the dam would allow 
only about 9 BCM annually to flow down to Syria and Iraq.215 Turkey 
treats this promise as a matter of accommodation, and not as a legal 
obligation, even though it is included in a bilateral agreement between 
Syria and Turkey signed in 1987.216 The relevant language of that 
agreement reads: 
During the tilling up period of the Atatiirk dam reservoir and until the 
final allocation of the waters of the Euphrates among the three riparian 
countries, the Turkish side undertakes to release a yearly average of 
more than 500 cubic meters per second at the Turkish-Syrian border 
and in cases where the monthly flow falls below the level of 500 
m3/sec., the Turkish side agrees to make up the difference during the 
following month. 217 
Turkey has not entirely lived up to this promise, but then neither has 
Syria lived up to its promises in the same agreement not to allow anti-
Turkish activities-by the Kurdish Workers Party-on Syrian soil.218 
While Turkey has, on at least one occasion, released water from the dam 
212. For a detailed description of the geography of the Orontes, see WATER IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST, supra note 1, at 115-18. 
213. Waterbury, supra note 49, at 141-42. 
214. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 162; Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 207-08, 215; 
Gruen, supra note 125, at 280; Kolars, supra note 11, at 107; Tekeli, supra note 71, at 210. 
215. Kolars, supra note 11, at 107-08. Many others have estimated that water delivers 
to Syria will amount to about 15 BCM/year, although this perhaps involves a double counting. 
HILLEL, supra note 2, at 103, 106; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 137, 145-46, 149; Chalabi & 
Majzoub, supra note 13, at 204-05; Gruen, supra note 125, at 280; Tekeli, supra note 71, at 
210; Waterbury, supra note 49, at 55. Kolars indicates that the Euphrates water crossing the 
Syrian border will be about 9 BCM/year, and the Euphrates water crossing the border to Iraq 
will be about 6 BCM/year-but the latter water will, of course, be composed mostly of the 
residue of the water crossing the Syrian border as only small amounts are contributed by 
tributaries feeding into the Euphrates in Syria. See also Joffe, supra note 20, at 76. 
216. Bakour & Kolars, supra note 2, at 134, 139; Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 
213; Cohen, supra note 13, at 513; Gruen, supra note 20, at 101-03, 105-06; Waterbury, 
supra note 49, at 58. 
217. Protocol on Matters Pertaining to Economic Cooperation, signed July 26, 1987, 
Syria-Turkey, art. 6 (unpublished). See Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 228. 
218. Gruen, supra note 20, at 102-03. 
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to maintain the flow at 500 m3/sec., thereby delaying the filling of the 
reservoir, Turkey has also virtually closed down the Euphrates for one 
winter month in 1990 and again during the Gulf War, reducing the flow 
to 125m3/sec in order to accelerate the filling of the reservoir behind the 
Atatiirk Dam. 219 Iraq and Syria protested vigorously against receiving 
such a small amount of water in the Euphrates, both rejecting Turkish 
claims to absolute sovereignty.220 Iraq's claim to the absolute integrity 
of the river was consistent with its approach toward its other neighbors, 
particularly Syria. 221 Syria, however, was embarrassed by its earlier 
claims of absolute sovereignty in water disputes with downstream 
neighbors, and continued to do so vis-a-vis Iraq, Israel, and Jordan.222 
Against Turkey, Syria based its claim on the theory of restricted 
sovereignty, demanding a "reasonable share" of the flow of the 
Euphrates. 223 As the proposed guaranteed flow was adequate to meet 
Syrian needs (if Syria disregarded any obligation to deliver water to 
Iraq), Syria did not persist in its objections. 224 Still, the disputes 
between Syria and Turkey over the GAP probably played a role in 
inducing Syria to support covertly the Kurdish rebellion against the Turks 
for this would, at the least, slow the development plans of the Turks for 
both the Tigris and the Euphrates. 225 
Iraq faces a real possibility of a near exhaustion of the Euphrates as 
a source of water by Syria and Turkey; it therefore has had no option but 
219. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 106; KuoT, supra note 2, at 128, 162; Cohen, supra note 
13, at 513-14; Alan Cowell, Now, a Little Stream, Later, Maybe a Water War, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 2, 1990, at All; Haberman, supra note 53, at A4; Nick Wiliams, jr., Parched Iraq, Syria 
Jittery as Turks Divert Euphrates to Power Project, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1990, at A8. On 
releases during the drought of 1991, see Gruen, supra note 20, at 105. See also liter Turan, 
Politics of Water and the Role of Regional Organizations: The Middle East, in POLICY AND 
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS, supra note 3, at 152, 155 (the Turks reduced the flow of the 
Euphrates to 170 m3/sec. in 1993 because of lull in the needs electricity, causing them to 
release less water through their turbines). 
220. KuoT, supra note 2, at 123; Sheherezade Daneshku & Andrews Gowers, Shrinking 
Euphrates Raises Turkish-Syrian Tension, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1990, § 1, at 3; Gruen, supra 
note 20, at 101; Hager, supra note 2, at 216-17; Tekeli, supra note 71, at 211. 
221. See text supra at notes 80-86. 
222. See the authorities collected supra at note 212. 
223. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 306 n.l2; KuoT, supra note 2, at 123; Hager, supra note 
2, at 216. 
224. Joffe, supra note 20, at 76; Kolars, supra note 11, at 115. There were, however, 
persistent rumors of a Syrian plot to blow up the Atatiirk Dam. Starr & Alley, supra note 37, 
at 5. 
225. BESCHORNER, supra note i07, at 37; KuoT, supra note 2, at 164-65; Cohen, supra 
note 13, at 513; Cowell, supra note 219; Gruen, supra note 20, at 102-04, 106; Haberman, 
supra note 107, at A4; Hager, supra note 2, at 221-22; Tvedt, supra note 8, at 18; Turan, 
supra note 219, at 155; Waterbury, supra note 49, at 55. 
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to the continues its objections to Turkey's activities. The seriousness of 
the difficulties facing Iraq was made clear when Iraq and Syria signed an 
agreement on April16, 1990, to share whatever water reaches Syria from 
Turkey on a basis 42% to Syria and 58% to Iraq. 226 If the optimistic 
estimates of Syria receiving 15 BCM of water in the Euphrates were 
realized, this agreement would reduce Iraq's present usage from the river 
by about half. 227 Syria would lose nearly half of its planned usage as 
well, and if actual deliveries were to fall below this level, the outcome 
would be even worse for Iraq and Syria. Yet none of these figures factor 
in that increasingly the water reaching Syria and especially Iraq will be 
degraded return flows of ever poorer quality, or that something like 5 
BCM must remain in the Euphrates if one is to maintain any sense of 
ecological integrity. 228 These figures raise real questions about how 
seriously Iraq can rely on the Syrian promise when Syria continues with 
plans to vastly increase its use and when the relations between Iraq and 
Syria are so hostile in other respects. 229 
Iraq faced an even greater risk when Turkey proposed to sell water 
to national communities outside the basin of the two rivers. Iraq has 
gone further than Syria, demanding that Turkey respect the absolute 
integrity of the river, or at least that Turkey cause "no harm" to 
established uses downstream.230 The proposal to export water from the 
upper Euphrates to national communities outside the watershed of the 
river has already generated major regional opposition, particularly from 
Iraq.Z31 At the very least, such exports demonstrate that Turkey does 
not need the water it is storing from the Euphrates, and thus that Iraq and 
Syria's "equitable shares" should be larger than Turkey would concede 
to them. The "Peace Pipeline" proposals therefore include substantial 
226. BESCHORNER, supra note 107, at 41-42; KLIOT, supra note 2, at 149, 162; Bakour 
& Kolars, supra note 2, at 139; Cohen, supra note 13, at 513-14; Gruen, supra note 20, at 
100; Waterbury, supra note 49, at 57. 
227. STARR & STOLL, supra note 33, at 9; Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 204, 
208; Cohen, supra note 13, at 515; B.A. Hurwitz, The Water Crisis in the Middle East, 13 
MIDDLE EAST F. 6 (1991); Jeffrey Lee & John Bulloch, Spirit of War Moves on Mid-East 
Waters: Arab States Fear a Plot to Control Their Supplies of Water, THE INDEPENDENT, May 
13, 1990, at 13, 13; Waterbury, supra note 49, at 58-59. For Iraqi usage, see the text supra 
at note 49-52. 
228. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 149-50; Waterbury, supra note 49, at 58. See also Clor, 
supra note 83, at 36-37. 
229. Waterbury, supra note 49, at 57-58. 
230. MAJID KHADDURI, SOCIALIST IRAQ 163 (1978); KLIOT, supra note 2, at 123; Gruen, 
supra note 20, at 101, 105. Robert Hager has characterized the Iraqi claims as being based 
upon priority of use rather than on the integrity of the river. Hager, supra note 2, at 215-16, 
219-20. 
231. Gruen, supra note 125, at 282. 
254 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW 
[Volume 10 
water benefits for the Syrians, typically as much as one-sixth of the water 
to be exported.232 Syria's acceptance of such benefits, along ~ith _the 
realization of hydropower generation capabilities offered by the ptpelme, 
could largely defuse their objections to any such proposal. 233 ~o 
comparable arrangements have been proposed for Iraq, however, leavmg 
Iraq to press the legal case against the pipeline. 
The Iraqis in this regard are much stronger position to object than 
are the Ethiopians who have raised comparable objections to the proposed 
export of Nile water to the Jordan Valley. 234 Unlike Egyptian diver-
sions from the Nile, Turkish exports actually will reduce the amount of 
water flowing down to Iraq and Syria. Even exporting the water from 
the Ceyhan and Seyhan Rivers or even from other rivers rather than 
directly from the Euphrates235 would not seriously undermine Iraqi 
arguments as they could legitimately argue that directly or indirectly 
Euphrates water is used to replace the exported water. As a result of 
these concerns, the Iraqis are demanding that the water flowing in the 
Euphrates at the Syrian-Turkish border be increased from 500m3/sec. to 
700 m3/sec. 236 For now, the grander version of the Peace Pipeline 
seems stillborn, not because of Iraqi opposition but because Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf States seemed uninterested in accepting the costs (political 
as well as financial) of bringing the water from such a distance, 237 and 
even the more modest proposal to export water to the Jordan Valley 
could founder on Iraqi opposition. 
Even apart from the Peace Pipeline proposal, Turkey has found itself 
caught between its development desires and its need to appear to be a 
232. See the text supra at notes 129-34. 
233. See § 5 .03(c)(2), at notes 173-77. 
234. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 127-28, 247-48; ELISHA KALLY & GIDEON FISHELSON, 
WATER AND PEACE: WATER RESOURCES AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS 105 
(1993); R.O. Collins, History, Hydropolitics, and the Nile: Nile Control: Myth or Reality?, 
in THE NILE, supra note 15, at 153, 167; Gruen, supra note 125, at 277; Raj Krishna, The 
Legal Regime of the Nile Basin, in THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY, supra note 125, at 23, 32-34; 
Aaron Wolf & John Ross, The Impact of Scarce Water Resources on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 919, 942-43 (1992); EI-Sayyid Zohra, Egypt's Water Needs and the 
Dangers of Diverting Nile Water to Israel, in ISRAEL AND ARAB WATER, supra note 2, at 63-
65; Kamel Zuheiri, Development Projects on the Nile and Israel's Water Objectives, in ISRAEL 
AND ARAB WATER, supra, at 57, 60-62; Wolf, supra note 76, at 30-31. 
235. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 132; Gruen, supra note 125, at 282-83; Wachtel, supra note 
14, at 365-67. 
236. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 162; Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 207; Cohen, 
supra note 13, at 514 n.71; Gruen, supra note 125, at 282; Gruen, supra note 20, at 104; 
Kolars, supra note 11, at 115; Tekeli, supra note 71, at 210; Wachtel, supra note 14, at 366-
67. 
237. See the text supra at note 138. 
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"good neighbor" as it seeks membership in the European Union.238 In 
order to do so, Turkey has consistently portrayed itself as a peaceful state 
seeking a cooperative result with its co-riparians based upon technical 
solutions. 239 As part of this campaign, Turkey has offered to sell 
electricity both to Iraq and to Syria on favorable terms. 240 Turkey's 
claimed legal position, however, actually belies such a posture. In 
particular, the Turks claim that the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers are 
"transboundary" rivers rather than "international" rivers, and thus not 
subject to the rule of equitable utilization.241 Turkey claims absolute 
sovereignty over its "trans boundary rivers" before they across the border, 
analogizing to the absolute ownership of oil by states where oil fields are 
located.242 Turkey also would restrict negotiations to the main stem of 
the river, ignoring the contributions of any tributaries, basing this 
position on principles adopted at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.243 
Turkey's legal claims contradict the explicit terms of both the 
Helsinki Rules and the International Law Commission's Draft Arti-
cles. 244 Nor is there any support for this position in state practice. The 
Vienna Congress principles were intended to deal only with freedom of 
navigation, and not to the allocation of water to consumptive uses at 
all. 245 Even the analogy to oil does not hold up, as it ignores the 
obligation of "equitable pooling" imposed upon transboundary oil 
238. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 163, 167. 
239. /d., at 163; Tekeli, supra note 71, at 214. 
240. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 163; Tekeli, supra note 71, at 213. 
241. KLIOT, supra note 2, at 162-63; Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 209-12; 
Cohen, supra note 13, at 527-28; Sam Cohen, Iraq, Syria Challenge Turkey on Water Use, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 2, 1990, at 6; Gruen, supra note 20, at 101; Waterbury, supra 
note 49, at 57. This proposition serves to distinguish other waters shared by Turkey with 
Bulgaria, Greece, and the U.S.S.R., on all of which waters Turkey has reached agreements 
regarding equitable sharing. See Accord Relative to the Regulation of Hydraulic Works on the 
Maritza/Evros River, signed June 20, 1934, Greece-Turkey, pt. III, LEGISLATIVE TEXTS, supra 
note 148, no. 220; Agreement Concerning Co-Operation in the Use of Waters of Rivers Flowing 
through the Territory of Both Countries, signed Oct. 23, 1968, Bulgaria-Turkey, TREATIES 
CONCERNING THE NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES-EUROPE 
No. 22 (FAO Legislative Study no. 50, Stefano Burchi ed. 1993); Convention Regarding the 
Use of Frontier Waters, signed Jan. 8, 1927, Turkey-U.S.S.R., arts. 1, 11, LEGISLATIVE 
TEXTS, supra, no. 106. 
242. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 305 n.5; Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 208-09, 
212-13, 215, 226 n.113; Gruen, supra note 20, at 101. 
243. Waterbury, supra note 49, at 57. 
244. Draft Articles, supra note 184, art. 2(A); Helsinki Rules, supra note 194, arts. 2, 3. 
See Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 215-29; Gruen, supra note 20, at 101. 
245. See G. KAECKENBEECK, INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 37-61 (1919). See also CAPONERA, 
supra note 7, at 185. 
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fields.246 Under these circumstances, the Turkish position must be 
consider flatly wrong. 
Turkey adopted such a dubious legal positio~.be~aus~ its position in 
any dispute resolution focusing on equitable ut1hzat10n ts bound to be 
weak. Turkey has abundant sources of water other than the Euphrates 
and the Tigris; those two rivers comprise only about 45% of the total 
247 h . water resources available to Turkey. In contrast, t ose nvers 
comprise about 80% of the water resources of Syria, and 98% of the 
surface waters available to Iraq. 248 In light of these facts, Turkey 
cannot validly claim the lion's share of the water from those two rivers, 
whether for its own inefficient consumption practices, for sale to other 
national communities, or to replace other waters to be sold to the other 
national communities249-even though the other national committees 
also desperately need water. On the other hand, Iraq in particular cannot 
claim a vested right to continue its highly inefficient water-use practic-
es. 250 Nor should Turkey have to bear the entire cost of building the 
necessary facilities to assure adequate water supplies to Iraq and Syria, 
although those two states have not expressed any willingness to pay part 
of the cost of adapting Turkey's facilities to their needs. 251 Ultimately, 
the needs of the entire fertile crescent can only be met by the sort of 
246. See Rainer Lagoni, Oil Deposits across National Frontiers, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 215 
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regional management arrangement.252 It is to this possibility that I shall 
address a few comments in the conclusion. 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT 
The problem to be solved in the land between the two rivers is how 
to allocate equitably the waters of the two rivers, especially of the 
Euphrates. The existing informal agreements arguably do this, with 
Turkey promising to Syria to deliver 500m3/sec. on the Euphrates to the 
Syria border, and Syria promising to Iraq not to consume more than 42% 
of the water that arrives at its border with Turkey. 253 None of the 
states involved, however, treat the agreements as final or definitive. 
Given the pressures of population growth, wasteful and extravagant usage 
of water, and mutual hostility, a final and definitive determination of 
what the equitable shares of Iraq and Syria are will not be easy to 
achieve. 254 
Even if the states were to agree to a partition of the waters, this 
would be a less than optimum solution. With each nation undertaking to 
store and develop its own share of the waters, excessive storage capacity 
will probably be built in the region.255 Even if there is no excessive 
storage capacity, there will be excessive and unnecessary evaporation 
losses because so much of the storage capacity will be built on the hot, 
dry plains of Iraq with the reservoir spreading over a large surface area, 
rather than in the relatively cool and narrow gorges of Turkey.256 In 
addition, each nation will build diversion and drainage works that are 
either duplicative or reciprocal, i.e., with roughly parallel canals carrying 
water in the same direction or on opposite directions on either side of a 
border, when a single canal (or perhaps no canal at all) would achieve the 
same or similar values with far less economic and environmental costs 
than would be under the unilateral approach to water management that 
252. See also STARR & STOLL, supra note 33, at 1-3, 40-43; Bakour & Kolars, supra note 
2, at 143-44; Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 13, at 227-29; Cohen, supra note 13, at 529-56; 
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possibility, see Waterbury, supra note 49, at 61-62. 
253. See the text supra at notes 214-17, 226-27. 
254. See, e.g., KLIOT, supra note 2, at 100-72, 270-72; Chalabi & Majzoub, supra note 
13, at 213-14; Gruen, supra note 20. 
255. See the authorities collected supra at note 42. 
256. HILLEL, supra note 2, at 103; IONIDES, supra note 21, at 111; KLIOT, supra note 
2, at 122, 136; Beaumont, supra note 14, at 38-39. More than half of the current evaporation 
losses occur in Iraq for the reasons indicated in the text. 
258 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 10 
results from partition.257 All of this is without considering the likeli-
hood of cheating and the difficulty of monitoring compliance under a 
partitioning approach-not to mention the rigidity of the system in the 
face of impending global warming. 
The restricted sovereignty approach to internationally shared waters 
rests ultimately on the concept of an international drainage basin as a 
coherent juridical and managerial unit, a concept widely supported by 
naturalists, engineers, and economists.258 The notion gives rise to the 
concept of integrated, basin-wide management of water resources 
transcending national (and other) frontiers. The United Nations has 
endorsed this principle at just about every opportunity. The most 
succinct and emphatic statement of this conclusion within U.N.-sponsored 
activities was the opening statement in a working paper prepared by the 
U.N. Secretariat for the Fourth Regional Technical Conference on Water 
Resources Development in Asia and the Far East, held in Colombo in 
1960: "River basin development projects are now necessarily multipur-
pose and lead to unified development. "259 The U.N. Economic 
Commission for Europe has adopted three instruments relative to 
international water management. The "Declaration of Policy on 
Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, Including Transboundary 
Pollution," merely indicates that "rational utilization of water resources" 
is a basic element of long-term water management. 260 The "Declaration 
of Policy on the Rational Use of Water" recommended a "unified 
strategy" and "coordinated utilization. "261 The "Recommendations to 
ECE Governments on Long-Term Planning of Water Management" 
endorse basin-wide, cooperative management of shared water resourc-
es.262 And the principle were endorsed unanimously by the United 
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Nations Water Conference at Mar del Plata, Argentina, in 1977.263 
This goal, and the avoidance of the inefficiencies and other problems 
inherent in partition, can only be avoided by creating a regional water 
management authority including (at the least) Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. 
It would be better, but not essential, to include Iran, given its relation to 
the Tigris River. On the other hand, if the Peace Pipeline (or something 
like it) were to be included, one would need to add Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Palestine (and perhaps some others). 
A regional relationship involving at least the three active riparian 
states (Iraq, Syria, and Turkey), is easy to envision but would likely be 
extraordinarily difficult to realize given the hostilities between or even 
within these states. Enlarging it either to the west (Iran) or to the 
southwest (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine) would be even more 
difficult. Only the extreme need likely to emerge as global warming 
becomes a reality is likely to overcome this hostility-if it does not 
prompt "water wars" instead.264 
On the positive side, one can note that the four riparian states (Iran, 
Iraq, Syria, and Turkey) all share a common legal and cultural tradition 
regarding their approach to water management issues derived from the 
traditional Islamic law-the shari 'a. Indeed, the very word shari'a 
originally meant "the path to the watering place. "265 The shari'a 
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allocates community water among users and calls upon water users from 
time to time to maintain the communal water system?66 We can trace 
this approach all the way back to the Code of Hammurabi in ancient 
Babylon and down to the present day.267 
Expanding the regional management scheme to include the entire 
Fertile Crescent would bring in Israel, the law of which is not based upon 
the shari 'a. The Israeli legal tradition pertaining to water is not 
materially different from the modern concepts applicable to water in the 
Islamic states. The ancient traditions-almost as old as the Code of 
Hammurabi-is very similar to the shari'a and its antecedents?68 
Whether the laws laid down by the prophets are derived from Babylonian 
roots or simply reflect similar responses to similar problems hardly 
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matters. The contemporary Israeli water law also treats water as a 
community resource rather than as private property. 269 
That all potential participants share a tradition of centralized 
management of water for the benefit of the entire community suggests 
that integrated management on a regional basis could be accepted by the 
several national communities. In addition, despite the hostilities between 
and within these nations which might lead one to expect fighting rather 
than sharing to be the normal response to water crisis, there is in fact 
considerable evidence that water is simply too important to fight 
over. 270 Perhaps nowhere has this been demonstrated more dramatical-
ly than in the relations of India and Pakistan. The two states have 
engaged in three full-scale, albeit limited, wars since 1948, as well as 
numerous other skirmishes and serious threats of warY' Yet during 
this same period, India and Pakistan negotiated and implemented a 
cooperative management scheme for the waters of the Indus Valley.272 
And in each outbreak of war, they did not target water facilities or 
interfere in the operations of the water arrangements. 273 
Each national community sharing the Fertile Crescent should 
recognize that it will receive significant benefits from the integrated 
management scheme. 274 If the do so, they can be expected to discover 
the necessary steps to accommodate themselves to the requirements of the 
cooperative or integrated management arrangement. All that is required 
is some political imagination and the political will to place the needs of 
the community ahead of the needs of the political leadership of the 
community. Unfortunately, recent events in Mesopotamia suggests that 
both qualities might be in short supply. 
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